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Multiple Representation of Targets and Witnesses
During a Grand Jury Investigation
PETER

W. TAGUE*

The propriety of one attorney representing several clients whose
conduct is under investigation by a grand jury has been explored
only superficially by the courts and the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Responsibility. Prosecutors nonetheless have
often moved to disqualify counsel representing multiple clients in
recent years, basingtheir motions both on the client's interestin loyal
and competent representation and on the government's interest in
the unimpeded progress of the grand jury investigation. Professor
Tague discusses the factors that counsel should consider in deciding
whether to undertake multiple representation at the grand jury
stage, including strategy, ethics, and the doctrinal grounds for
disqualification. He concludes that, while the motion to disqualify
should rarely be granted, multiple representation is a risky venture
that should rarely be undertaken.
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years,' prosecutors have frequently moved to
disqualify counsel from simultaneously representing more than one client
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1965, Harvard College; J.D. 1969, University of
Michigan Law School. Member of the bars of California, New York, and the District of Columbia.
While writing this article, I spoke with many of the attorneys involved in the various cases involving
motions to disqualify. I thank each for his or her cooperation. Because the conversations were both on and
off the record, I have decided not to identify sources in most instances.
1. The first reported decision of a disqualification motion appears to be Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341
A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1083 (1976). Since Pirillo,decisions on some fifteen motions have been reported. See note 10 infra. What
sparked the prosecutor's interest in moving to disqualify is an important, but probably unanswerable,
question. In the antitrust context, for example, it was once common for one attorney to represent both the
corporation and its employees during a grand jury investigation. Address by Richard Favretto, Chicago
Bar Association Antitrust Symposium (May 3, 1977) (copy on file with American Criminal Law Review).
Recently, however, the Antitrust Division has moved to disqualify counsel, and Favretto, who was then
Deputy Director of Operations of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, has publicly
criticized the practice of multiple representation. Id.; Address by Richard Favretto, 12th Annual Antitrust
Institute, Ohio State Bar Association (Oct. 27, 1978) (copy on file with American Criminal Law Review);
Address by Richard Favretto, ALI-ABA Course of Study on Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations (Oct. 4,
1979) (copy on file with American Criminal Law Review). The government's interest in opposing multiple
representation, Favretto argues, is to eliminate counsel as an impediment to the investigation. Favretto
Address to Chicago Bar, supra, at 3. The benefit of separate representation for the clients, he contends, is
fulfillment of the need each has for personalized assistance, given the increased penalties for antitrust
violations enacted by Congress in 1974 in amendments to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976),
(originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209), Favretto Address (May 3, 1977),
supra, at 2, and given the shift from transactional to use immunity, id. at 12. For other questionable
explanations, see note 67 infra.
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when those clients may be targets or witnesses (or a combination of the two)
of a grand jury investigation of alleged criminal conduct. 2 The prosecutor
believes that the grand jury cannot crack the purported criminal enterprise
without cooperation from one or more of counsel's clients. 3 He cannot
approach each client to explain the alternatives available and the danger of
noncooperation. He is reluctant to immunize or to offer a plea bargain or a
promise of nonprosecution unless he receives a proffer as to the help that that
client might provide in exchange. When no client comes forward to cooperate, the prosecutor suspects that counsel is the mortar in the "stonewall." '4
Not surprisingly, the prosecutor, frustrated, brings the disqualification
motion on the hope that, once counsel is removed, the "wall" will crumble.
Many defense attorneys,5 in contrast, characterize differently the government's purpose in moving to disqualify. 6 Theyview the motion to disqualify
2. Several prosecutors told me that they felt obliged to make the formal motion when discreet attempts
to inform counsel of the conflict problem failed to induce him to withdraw on his own.
3. Perhaps the model case illustrating the textual discussion is In re Investigation Before April 1975
Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A grand jury was investigating the destruction of press
machinery of the Washington Post during a labor strike by the Pressmen's Union. The Union retained Sol
Rosen to represent its members, but the nature of his representation is unclear from the record. He met
with over 100 of the union members and lectured them about the nature of the investigation, the right to
invoke the fifth amendment, and the opportunity to cooperate with the government. In part to avoid a
conflict, though, he did not speak individually with any union member. Of the first 21 members
subpoenaed to testify, 19 invoked the privilege and the other two testified that they knew nothing of the
destruction of the equipment. The government then moved to disqualify Rosen on the grounds that the
witnesses were improperly invoking the privilege, that Rosen was providing ineffective assistance of
counsel and that, as a result, the grand jury's investigation was impeded. Id. at 604. The district court
granted the motion, ordering Rosen to withdraw and requiring each union member to retain separate
counsel (to the extent that only one attorney from any firm could represent a union member). In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.D.C. 1975). During oral argument before
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one judge asked the government why it had not
immunized one or more of the witnesses who had invoked the fifth amendment. The government
responded that it did not intend to immunize anyone unless it knew the substance of the witness's
testimony, to avoid immunizing someone with obvious culpability or someone who would provide
marginal assistance. That judge then asked why the government could not, through investigation,
determine which of the witnesses were more likely to provide helpful testimony or were more culpable. The
government responded that it had not been able to make either determination. The court of appeals
reversed the disqualification order on the ground that the government had failed to establish its burden that
a conflict existed, that Rosen actually represented the subpoenaed members, that the members would not
have waived the conflict if it existed and that they might have testified if they had separate representation.
531 F.2d at 607. Rosen's conduct illustrates the sharp disagreement concerning multiple representation.
One commentator characterizes Rosen's representation as "dismal," Cole, Time for a Change: Multiple
Representation Should be Stopped, 2 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 149, 153 (1976); another characterizes the
government's motion to disqualify Rosen as "dismal," Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, & Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 672
(1977) (Grand Jury Reform Bill) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson H.R. 94] (statement by Patrick Tobin,
Washington Representative, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union).
4. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 269 (5th Cir. 1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Favretto Address to
Chicago Bar, supranote 1,at 13. The obviously pejorative term "stonewalling," taken from the Watergate
investigation, is probably used by prosecutors to criticize implicitly any attempt to impede an investigation.
5. I use the term "defense counsel" as a shorthand description of any attorney who represents an entity
or individual who may be a target of, a subject of, or a witness before the grand jury.
6. The motion to disqualify is a more forthright attack on counsel than that mounted by prosecutors
during the Nixon era. So far as I can determine, the government never moved to disqualify counsel from
representing witnesses or targets during any of the many investigations of political conduct during the late
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as an aggressive attempt by the government to destroy the cohesiveness of a
labor union or political group,7 or as a tool to enable the government to
influence the client to select a more compliant attorney. They believe that the
"stonewall" is a proper defense approach (assuming the clients do not want to
cooperate unless forced to do so by a grant of immunity) and that the
prosecutor's argument that counsel should be disqualified for having violated
his ethical obligations is sophistry, enabling the prosecutor to disguise his true
purpose of obtaining cooperation without giving anything in exchange. To
support this belief, they point out that the government has taken the
inconsistent positions of urging adoption of a per se rule against multiple
representation when it has moved to disqualify, 8 but of not moving to
disqualify an attorney whose clients will cooperate without demanding
immunity, a favorable plea bargain, or a promise of nonprosecution in return.
Despite the need to resolve whether or when counsel may represent more
than one client at the grand jury stage, courts have provided inconsistent help
to the government and scant instruction to defense counsel. 9 Although the
decisions are about equally divided on whether the government's motion
should be granted, 10 those in which counsel have been disqualified have
1960's and early 1970's. However, defense counsel in many of those investigations report that the
government attempted to intimidate them by accusing them of obstructing justice when they spoke to
uncounselled witnesses, when they counselled their clients to invoke the fifth amendment, or when they
refused to reveal information about their clients (for example, identity, location, and fee arrangements). See
generally Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1263 (1976). Nonetheless, one attorney who recently was disqualified from multiple
representation reported that the government instituted an Internal Revenue Service investigation of his
personal tax returns once he appealed the order.
7. Reported comments by prosecutors, such as "investigation by terrorism," NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1975,
at 113--that is, subpoenaing targets in the hope that they will perjure themselves or improperly refuse to
testify, thereby inviting a contempt citation-fuel this fear of defense counsel.
Defense counsel have occasionally struck back. One attorney, for example, disqualified from representing four witnesses subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp.
273 (E.D. Mich. 1976), filed a defamation action against Newsweek magazine based on an article allegedly
critical of counsel's representation (copy of complaint on file with American Criminal Law Review).
Counsel withdrew that complaint when Newsweek published no further articles about his representation.
8. E.g., In re Special February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting per se
requirement of disqualification whenever conflict potential).
9. As one attorney wrote, "A review of these cases [involving multiple representation] can only lead the
practicing attorney to a hopeless impasse in arriving at a decision as to whether to undertake the multiple
representation of witnesses appearing before a federal grand jury when such multiple representation may
well be to the best interest of all those witnesses." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10 (Nov. 6, 1978), In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F.Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd per curiam by equally divided court, 576
F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
10. For cases granting the motion see United States v. Clarkson, 567 F. 2d 270 (4th Cir. 1977) (defense
attorney disqualified because he prepared tax returns for his client being audited by IRS); In re
Investigative Grand Jury Proceeding, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.
1976) (possibility of conflict of interest due to dual representation enough to allow trial court discretion to
disqualify); United States v. RMI Co., 467 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (disqualification motions granted
with respect to representation of corporate employees whose attorney represented defendant corporation);
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp 818 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (grand jury witnesses given immunity
and testimony detrimental to other clients of their attorney; disqualification granted), affd per curiam by
equally divided court, 576 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.) (en banc),cert denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (witnesses similarly represented may have learned grand
jury testimony of other witnesses); People ex rel. Losavio v. J.L., 580 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978) (counsel's offer
to forego statutory right to be present as client testified before grand jury not basis to permit multiple
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involved egregious conduct by counsel," have involved unusual restrictions
on counsel's representations,12 or have represented raw judicial power;13 those
in which counsel has not been disqualified have frequently been based on an
inadequate record of whethe; a conflict existed, whether the clients' conduct
would have differed if each had been separately represented, or whether the
clients' waivers were acceptable.14 Still unresolved by the decisions are two
questions: first, identification of the factual predicate necessary to establish an
existent or potential conflict and the allocation of the burden of proof on that
issue; and second, identification of the factual predicate necessary to establish
a waiver of the conflict and the effect of such a purported waiver.1 5
Legislative pronouncements provide no more help. Disciplinary Rule 5105(C) of the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional
Responsibility inconsistently instructs counsel to forego multiple representation if it is not obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each,
but then apparently permits informed clients to waive the effect of any
conflict. 16 A recommendation by the Committee on the Grand Jury of the
representation); Pirillo v.Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d
11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
For cases denying the motion see In re Special February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir.
1978) (no abuse of discretion in denial of motion); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977) (motion
premature where witness had not yet appeared before grand jury or indicated intention to exercise fifth
amendment rights); In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976) (mere
fact that witnesses with same attorney invoked fifth amendment insufficient to warrant disqualification); In
re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (motion premature as
government should have brought individual witnesses before court for ruling with respect to whether fifth
amendment was properly invoked); SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (before excluding counsel
from questioning of his clients by SEC, SEC must adduce concrete evidence that his presence would
obstruct or impede investigation); In re Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (no conflict of
interest where attorney represented employees whose corporate employer was target of grand jury
investigation); In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (attorney with
alleged conflict nevertheless granted pro hac vice status).
11. In two cases, for example, counsel himself was the target and his clients were possible witnesses
against him. United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Investigation Before February,
1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977).
12. Counsel was disqualified in one state court decision because, inter alia, a state rule which barred
disclosure of a witness's testimony would have created tension for counsel who was obliged to inform
Client B of the testimony of Client A. Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 531, 341 A.2d 896, 906 (1975), affd per
curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). Such a
restriction does not exist in the federal system. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); People ex rel. Losavio v. J.L.,
580 P,2d 23 (Colo. 1978) (client's offer to forego statutory right to counsel to be present as client testified
before grand jury not basis to permit multiple representation).
13. E.g., In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1976) (disqualification followed nonfactual
examination of conflict issue); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818, 821 (V.D. Pa. 1977)
(client's attempt to waive any conflict rejected as uninformed), affd per curiam by equally divided court,
576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). Gopman was later implicitly
disapproved, at least at the post-indictment stage. United States v. Mahar, 550 F.2d 1005, 1008 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1977).
14. E.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand
Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
15. Resolution of these issues is especially important because appellate courts have asked only whether
the lower court abused its power in deciding to disqualify or not to disqualify. See In re Special February
1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1978) (no abuse in denying government's motion to
disqualify); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976) (no abuse in granting government's motion
to disqualify).
16. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) and (B) provide that a
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ABA directs counsel not to represent more than one client "if the exercise of
(his or her). . . independent professional judgment on behalf of one of the
clients will be or is likely to be adversely affected by . . . representations of
another client."1 7 But that recommendation fails to explain when a conflict
may emerge and does not grapple with the difficult question of whether
cotinsel should elect to withdraw in the face of a demand by informed clients
for him to continue. The Judicial Conference has not included in Rule 44(c),18
a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, any
provision with respect to multiple representation at the pre-charge stage.
It does not follow, however, from the judicial refusal to drive counsel from
the case, or from the unhelpful legislative pronouncements, that attorneys
should eagerly agree to represent more than one client. Multiple representation presents grave risks to counsel and his clients. Multiple representation
may force counsel to structure his representation of all in a way that he would
not if he represented but one client. To maximize the position of all, he may
compromise the position of individual clients. In cases where he must
withdraw, counsel may have acted on behalf of all in a way that destroyed the
attorney-client privilege of each, thereby exposing all to great risk at the
hands of any one who decides later to cooperate. 19 And counsel himself risks
exposure by way of an obstruction of justice charge, a contempt citation, an
ethical inquiry by a disciplinary board or by the judge supervising the grand
jury investigation, or a malpractice suit instituted by a disgruntled client who
ultimately suffers from that multiple representation.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to extrapolate clear guidelines from the
reported cases and the impressions of attorneys 20 to assist counsel (and his
lawyer should forego representation of multiple clients "if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected," or if the representation would be
likely to involve him in representing different interests. However, DR 5-105(C) allows him to represent the
clients "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each."
The substitute for DR 5-105(C), proposed by the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, is no more helpful. Proposed Rule 1.8 provides:
CONFLICT OF INTEREsT

In circumstances in which a lawyer has interests, commitments, or responsibilities that may
adversely affect the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not represent the client unless: (a)
The services contemplated in the representation can otherwise be performed in accordance
with the rules of Professional Conduct; and (b) The client consents after adequate disclosure
of the circumstances.
ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Discussion Draft of Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8 (Jan. 30, 1980). Interestingly, Proposed Rule 1.8 may relax the
proscription of DR 5-105(A), (B), and (C). Counsel might conclude, for example, that he could
competently represent his clients, given the "services contemplated" (see text accompanying note 99 infra),
when his representation would involve "differing interests" and would not "obvious[ly]" protect the
interests of each client.
17. ABA Report to House of Delegates 47 ABA ANTITRUST L. J. 557, 559, 574 0978) (Principle 21 and
Appendix).
18. Amendments to FED. R. CRiM. P., 441 U.S. 985, 999 (1979). Congress has postponed adoption of
Rule 44(c) until December 1, 1980. H.R.4712, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H6377 (daily ed. July
23, 1979); H.R. 4712, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S10,461 (daily ed. July 24, 1979).
19. See discussion in text following note 45 infra.
20. An important question is why counsel elects to represent more than one client. A review of the cases
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clients) in deciding when the potential benefits of multiple representation
outweigh the possible risks, and at what point that balance may shift.
Nonetheless, I hope to identify several of the factors that counsel should
consider in deciding whether to agree to, and when to withdraw from,
multiple representation. Before that attempt, however, it is helpful to discuss
the nature of conflicts at the grand jury stage, the reasons why clients might
prefer and why the government is opposed to multiple representation, and the
doctrinal pegs available to support disqualification.

II.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICTS AT THE GRAND JURY STAGE

The root nature of a conflict at the grand jury stage is the same as that at
trial: to zealously represent Client A, counsel must act on his behalf in a way
that he cannot if that action might disadvantage Client B; yet, in failing to aid
Client A, counsel misserves that client. Implicit in this double bind, of course,
clients in the same way as
is the assumption that counsel must represent both
2
he would if he represented either one alone. '
But a conflict may be less likely to erupt at the grand jury stage than at
trial-or, at least may be less likely to injure both clients irremediably.2 2 At
trial, defense counsel is expected to participate actively by cross-examination,
by presentation of defense evidence, by argument, and, when necessary, by
allocution. That active role for counsel at trial is not always the role that he
will or should play at the grand jury stage. The conflict at the grand jury stage
suggests various reasons. The most common is to continue an already-existing attorney-client relationship
with a target entity or a third-party payor. This preexisting relationship takes several forms. The attorney
may have a prepaid contract to represent the members of the entity, see Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341
A.2d 896 (1975), affTd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1083 (1976); or the attorney may have an undisclosed agreement to represent the underlings of a criminal,
cf In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271, 266 A.2d 275 (1970) (improper to accept payment from A to represent B
when B apparently is part of A's criminal enterprise); or the attorney has previously represented the clients
in the very matter that has come under investigation, and thus has an intimate knowledge of a complex
factual situation, see In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1185 (2d Cir. 1977); SECv. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). In this third context, the government often suspects that the work by counsel predating the
grand jury investigation was itself an integral part of the criminal enterprise. Counsel himself may thus be a
target. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled 2/14/78, 603 F.2d 469, 472 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Investigation
Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1977). Counsel may also be
sympathetic to the political position of his clients. Or, he may be retained solely to provide instruction
about the nature of a grand jury investigation, but not to assist each witness or target individually. See In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussed in note 3 supra). Last,
many attorneys believe it appropriate to represent family members or shareholder-officers of a close
corporation, each of whom may have equal exposure.
21. Also implicit is the assumption that counsel understands what a conflict is and recognizes the
possible loci and crippling effects of conflicts. If that assumption is proven inaccurate in a given case, the
court should disqualify to protect counsel and his clients from counsel's insensitivity.
22. This point is necessarily impressionistic. It is not possible to evaluate accurately the relative
disadvantages of a conflict before as against after indictment. Before indictment, the guilty client may have
a better opportunity to negotiate a favorable disposition, and the innocent client, by cooperating, may be
able to avoid indictment and the concomitant burden of proving his innocence at trial. See generally ABA,
HANDBOOK ON ANTITRUST GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 89-90 (1978) (listing alternatives for
individual which he may be prevented from pursuing by multiple representation). On the other hand, the
advantages of multiple representation are probably greater before indictment than after indictment.
Compare Part III infra (pre-indictment) with Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in
Criminal Cases, 67 GEo. L.J. 1075, 1122-25 (1979) (post-indictment).
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develops from counsel's failure to seek a favor from the prosecution on behalf
of Client A-immunity, a promise of nonprosecution, or a plea bargain-in
exchange for that client's cooperation whenever that cooperation might
disadvantage Client B. But it is not always clear that cooperation with the
government benefits his clients. Clients may fear being immunized as much as
they fear being indicted. 23 A client who agrees to accept what appears to be a
favorable plea bargain before indictment may be saddened when his former
co-clients are acquitted at trial, or never indicted at all. 24 None of counsel's
clients may be targets, even though they may be exposed to criminal liability.
None may be indicted, even if they are targets: the investigation may falter
and end, or the grand jury may refocus its attention elsewhere. All may be
indicted for crimes no more serious in number or kind than those to which
they would have pled guilty in exchange for cooperation. All may be able to
obtain a disposition after indictment that is not too different from that which
they might have obtained beforehand. Conversely, an offer to cooperate may
backfire: in rejecting counsel's proffer on behalf of one client, the prosecutor
may obtain information that furthers25 the investigation of that client or that
convinces him to indict that client.
Nonetheless, a potentially damaging conflict is all but inherent in certain
attorney-client relationships, whether at the grand jury stage or later. First,
payment of counsel's fees by someone other than the client presents several
problems. An entity with exposure to criminal liability may ask its previously
retained counsel to represent. its members or employees, some of whom may
be targets and others witnesses. 26 An entity that is free of criminal exposure
23. One defense attorney notes that certain clients prefer not to be immunized out of concern that their
testimony might result in civil tax liability, possible loss of licenses, class-action suits, or extradition for
extraterritorial violation of securities laws. See Address by Seymour Glanzer, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL
Seminar, [1979] 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2105, 2107. Other reasons include damage to one's reputation
and fear of retribution from those whom the immunized witness might implicate.
These reasons to reject immunity may underlie the legislative proposal to give the witness the right to
reject an offer of immunity. See Appendix to Hearings on S. 3405 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1978).
24 For example, a prospective government witness who had plea bargained in exchange for his
testimony in the bribery trial of former Congressman Otto Passman rued that he had not gone to trial when
the government did not indict as many people as he had anticipated. Washington Post, March 29, 1979,
§ A, at 6, col. 5.
25. The client has no recourse if the prosecutor rejects the proffer and refuses to extend immunity or to
plea bargain. United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1977). Although admissions made during
plea negotiations may be protected, FED. R. EVID. 410 (statements made during plea negotiations with
prosecutor not admissible in subsequent proceedings), the grand jury's power to subpoena may permit the
government to circumvent the client's fifth amendment protection to obtain documents or evidence
revealed during the proffer. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (subpoena of taxpayer's
records from accountant). And Rule 410 may not apply if the client bargains for immunity or promise of
non-prosecution, rather than bargaining to plead guilty to a particular charge. Multiple representation also
presents a risk if one of the clients agrees to cooperate without disclosing that fact to counsel and conveys
information about his co-clients to the government. Cf Glanzer, supra note 23 (describing practice in
several securities cases where immunized witness, armed by the government with an interception device,
spoke to defendants). Because the sixth amendment right to counsel does not apply before a formal charge,
the clients have no constitutional protection against governmental seizure of information in this way. See,
e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
26. In this context a number of attorneys have elected to represent either the corporation or its
employees, in part out of concern that indemnification of the employees for the legal expenses may be an
improper corporate expenditure. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, [August 9, 1979] 926 ANTITRUST
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may nonetheless incur civil liability or receive adverse publicity through the
criminal culpability of its members, creating the same potential conflict
between the payor's interests and those of its members or employees. Second,
counsel himself may be a target of the investigation, and his clients may be the
sources of information that will damn him. 27 Third, a witness who is a target
and one who is a nontarget,
but who has some exposure, may ask counsel to
28
represent them both.
These obvious conflict situations do not exhaust the possible loci of
conflicts, however. Counsel's problem at the grand jury stage is in obtaining
information to determine what exposure his clients have to criminal liability
and what risks they run by not cooperating. The grand jury operates in
secrecy and secrecy is frequently a vital component of a successful investigation. A client who is a subpoenaed witness or a target is not entitled to
discover from the government the direction of the investigation or the
information already gathered. The government does not always reveal the
subject matter of the investigation or the identity of witnesses (much less their
testimony), and may refuse to reveal the identity of the targets. Counsel has
no way to learn this information unless the prosecutor voluntarily discloses
it,29 or unless counsel can learn the identity of a witness and convince him to
&TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 1979) (counsel not disqualified, and did not choose to
withdraw, from representing corporate division and employee thereof who invoked fifth amendment in
criminal antitrust investigation). Also, because courts occasionally disqualify counsel for third-party
payment of counsel's fees, see Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa.
187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976), attorneys have sometimes
required the clients to pay the fees themselves (even if they merely transmit money received from the
corporation). Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 5-107(A) (1978)

(payment by third party appropriate with disclosure to and consent of client). However, several attorneys
accept payment by a third party knowing that few clients could personally afford top-flight representation,
and justify such payment by informing the payor that they will advance the interests of the clients rather
than the payor.
Counsel may also want to represent employees of his corporate client because of the difficult problem of
obtaining information about the corporation's exposure. Since the corporation acts through its employees,
counsel may not have access to needed information if he does not represent the employees unless they
voluntarily agree to speak with counsel. (Counsel would of course have access to corporate documents.) If
counsel does represent employees, he should indicate that he may advise them in the future to retain
separate representation or that they may choose to do so themselves. That indication is necessary because
the corporation may choose to blame or sanction its employees to limit its punishment. See Address by
John Coffee, Fordham Corporate Law Institute seminar, CriminalLaw and the CorporateCounsel, [1980]
26 CitIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2335 (discussing tactics for corporation at sentencing).
27. See In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977).

28. Attorneys are sensitive to this problem and have usually withdrawn from representing one. Cf In re
Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 542 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1976) (counsel, who had
previously represented target, instructed target to retain separate representation and continued to represent

witness; counsel nonetheless disqualified when remaining clients invoked fifth amendment); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd per curiam by equally divided court, 576 F.2d
1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (counsel withdrew from representation of several
witnesses once offer of nonprosecution extended to them; disqualified from representing one witness, who
was given same offer but who nonetheless attempted to waive possible conflict).
29. The Department of Justice follows the practice of informing a witness of the general subject matter of
the investigation (as long as that disclosure would not adversely affect the investigation), of the right not to
incriminate himself, of the risk that anything the witness says could be used against him, of the opportunity
to consult with counsel outside the grand jury room, and of his status as a target (substantial evidence links
that person to the commission of a crime) or as a subject (that person's conduct is within the scope of the
investigation). See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL,

tit. 9, § 9-11.250 (1977). The Constitution, however, does not require such disclosure. See United States v.
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discuss his testimony. 30 As a result, counsel may not know what questions to
ask his clients or at what point he has received as much information as his
clients possess. Hence, in representing multiple clients, interviewing each
separately without disclosing to any the information provided by the others 3'
may not provide counsel with the information he needs to assess whether
conflicts exist that should prompt him to withdraw from representing one or
more clients. Counsel may not even have time to discuss the individual
position of each client if the government has subpoenaed his clients on short
notice. 32 Or, counsel may not have enough time to discuss in depth with a
target client his criminal exposure if, as frequently happens, the prosecutor
chooses to subpoena the targets as the first witnesses. A client, in turn, may be
reluctant to disclose information that incriminates him or his co-clients for
fear that counsel will disclose that information to the co-clients, in spite of
counsel's assertion that he will not.
Just as the grand jury process works to deny counsel information, counsel
may structure his representation to deny himself information and avoid
uncovering a conflict. He might, for example, choose to lecture his clients
about the nature and effect of a conflict and about the grand jury process, 33
but refrain from questioning each client closely as to his knowledge,
involvement and desire to cooperate. 34 Although this sort of representation
avoids the emergence of a factual or tactical conflict, it is questionable. It may
damage the client who needs individualized attention, especially one who is
forced to testify through immunization. When the government was required
to give transactional immunity, a witness was protected no matter how
sketchy his testimony as long as he testified about the criminal act. With the
Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977) (no constitutional violation in failing to warn grand jury witness of his
status as a potential defendant). Of course, the extent to which the prosecutor discloses information about a
witness may be a function of the prosecutor's desire to terrorize that witness into cooperating fully.
30. A witness before a federal grand jury is not sworn to secrecy. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). State practice is
sometimes different. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
3 1. Attorneys usually begin their representation of multiple clients by informing them of the nature of a
grand jury investigation, of the opportunity to cooperate or to invoke the fifth amendment and of the risks
and advantages of multiple as against separate representation. If the clients want joint rather than separate
representation, the attorney then attempts to determine the facts each client possesses. Within this general
framework, however, an important difference exists between those attorneys who perform each step with
each client separately and those who speak to all of the clients at the same time. Speaking with all clients
simultaneously is a dangerous practice: the clients have the opportunity to pressure each other not to
decide what is in the best interests of each and not to disclose information that might harm the others; the
attorney-client privilege may also be eliminated between the clients. But interviewing the clients separately
also presents several interesting questions: if a conflict between Client A and Client B develops, from which
client does counsel withdraw, or how does counsel determine whether both nonetheless want counsel to
continue? If counsel decides to withdraw from Client A, can he notify Client B of the information he has
received from Client A? If a conflict develops between Client A and Client B, should counsel interview the
remaining clients or should he automatically refuse to represent them?
32. Although federal prosecutors are urged to use the "forthwith subpoena" sparingly, see UNrTED
STATES AI'rORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-11.230, subpoenas to appear on two-day notice
prompted one attorney not to interview his clients. See In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand
Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
33. See note 3 supra.
34. One attorney, in fact, told me that he rarely discusses the facts possessed by each client and learns of
them only when the client informs him of the prosecutor's question and his intended answer as the client
testifies. This is a questionable practice unless counsel believes that his client should invoke the fifth
amendment, but the failure to determine whether invocation of that privilege is justified may result in
problems for counsel. See text accompanying notes 150-56 infra.

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:301

switch to use immunity, however, the witness' incentive is to testify as fully as
possible. The government may not use against him his testimony or the fruits
thereof if the grand jury indicts him. As a consequence, counsel must learn
what information his client possesses and what information the client should
disclose while testifying.
If counsel who chooses not to question his clients closely nonetheless
unwittingly discovers a conflict, his choice of options is not easy. If, for
example, Client A reveals something that would damage him but would help
Client B, counsel is in the untenable position of considering whether to
pressure Client A to waive the attorney-client privilege to permit counsel to
inform Client B. There, as in the instance when Client B wishes to reveal
information that would damage A, counsel might withdraw from representing
B and remain with A. He cannot assist B to the detriment of A; he must release
his control over B to permit B to disclose. But counsel may not be able to
continue with A either if, as almost surely will have occurred, B has provided
counsel with privileged information which counsel could use to impeach B. If
B testifies at A's trial, counsel, to assist A, must attempt to impeach B with
that information. But B may be able to invoke the attorney-client privilege to
bar such questioning. The conflict would then damage A. Counsel should
have withdrawn from representing both clients.
Conflicts do not emerge at the grand jury stage simply .through counsel's
relationship with his clients. Unlike the post-charge stage, the government
has some control over whether a conflict will emerge at the grand jury stage.
After the indictment, the government rarely needs the cooperation of the
defendants; it has gathered its evidence. At the grand jury stage, however, the
government seeks information. It can force a witness to testify through a
grant of immunity, it can institute a contempt charge against an immunized
witness who refuses to testify, it can entice a witness to cooperate by offering a
favorable disposition, it can disclose information that divides the clients. The
government thus has the power to create a conflict that severs the agreement
not to cooperate, an agreement which was carefully crafted by counsel and his
clients.

III.

THE ADVANTAGES OF MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION

A conflict denies counsel the opportunity to act-even to consider
acting--on behalf of a client in the way that he might have acted had he
represented that client alone. But multiple representation does have three
principal advantages: it may contribute to the termination of the investigation, it may cause the government to aid one or more of counsel's clients in a
way it would not have if each had been separately represented, or it may result
in governmental disclosure of valuable information about the direction of the
investigation and the status of the clients.
If each client agrees not to attempt to advance his personal litigation
posture, and instead to play for the largest possible stake-that the government will drop the investigation or redirect it to focus on others-multiple
* representation provides the most effective way to achieve that hoped-for
result. The clients may have an allegiance to a political cause or to an
organization (a labor union or a corporation, for example) that supersedes the
desire of each (at least initially) to cooperate or to protect himself from
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prosecution or conviction. But any group of clients might benefit from united
opposition to the government. If none cooperates-that is, if no one makes a
proffer of testimony in exchange for favorable treatment, if all invoke the fifth
amendment when subpoenaed, perhaps even if all refuse to testify once
immunized-the government may be unable to indict any client because no
other credible sources possess enough admissible information to indict (much
less convict at trial), or because the prosecutor refuses to immunize or plea
bargain with any of counsel's clients without knowing what help he will
receive in return or what has been each client's involvement.3 5 This approach
may appear desperate and foolhardy, but the goal of aborting the investigation is not unrealistic. In In re Taylor,36 for example, the investigation ended
once the court of appeals announced its decision that counsel should not have
been disqualified. The same result occurred in Pirillov. Takiff 37 And, in In re
Investigation Before the 1975 Grand Jury,3 the grand jury did indict several
members 39of the Pressmen's Union, but not as many as might have been
expected.
On the other hand, multiple representation may also result in at least one of
counsel's clients receiving more from the government than he might have
received with separate representation. In this sense, the relationship of
multiple representation to the grand jury's investigation is like a game of draw
poker: the defense does not know what the government knows, wants, and is
willing to give; and the government is not certain what each client has to offer.
The benefit for the defense is in forcing the government to make the first
move, and to make that move blindly. 40 The client, by offering to cooperate
before he knows his exposure to criminal liability, may obtain less than he
35. See In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(government moved to disqualify counsel, renouncing as an alternative the "blind selection ... of random
witnesses for possible grants of immunity"). The Attorney General's guidelines for the grant of immunity
suggest why federal prosecutors usually demand a proffer as a condition of receiving immunity. In
determining whether to seek immunity, the prosecutor with authority to make such a request is expected to
consider, inter alia, "the value of the person's testimony or information to the investigation or prosecution;
• . . the person's relative culpability in connection with the offense . . being investigated or prosecuted,
and his history with respect to criminal activity;. . . the possibility of successfully prosecuting the person
prior to compelling him to testify or produce information." OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
GUIDELINES RELATING TO USE OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS TO COMPEL TESTIMONY OR PRODUCTION

OF INFORMATION (Jan. 14,1977), reprinted as Response to Request of Subcommittee Stafffor Comments on
OtherAspects of H.R. 94, in Hearingson HR.R 94, supra note 3, at 755, 774-75. To evaluate these points, the
prosecutor needs to know what the witness will testify to. See also Favretto Address (Oct. 27, 1978) supra
note I at 6 ("As a matter of practice during our investigations, we are insisting upon a proffer of testimony
before a potentially culpable individual is offered immunity in return for his testimony before the grand
jury."). Nonetheless, some defense attorneys steadfastly refuse to make that proffer under any circumstances. See Glanzer, supra note 23 (urging counsel who makes a proffer to condition its making upon
government's promise not to use information conveyed).
36. 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977).
37. 462 Pa. 511, 341 A. 2d 896 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). The
investigation, discussed in note 1 supra, ended because its federal funding was terminated before final
resolution of the disqualification issue on appeal.
38. 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
39. This is the opinion of the attorneys on both sides. See Cole, supra note 3, at 149, 151 nn.4-6, 153
(1976) (criticizing outcome and multiple representation in general as a "dismal scene").
40 It is, of course, a common negotiating ploy to attempt to get the opponent to make the first offer.
E.g., M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL EDUCATION 235 (1974).
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would have received by waiting. If the government needs the information
from an insider to crack the enterprise, it must act. If no client will make a
proffer, the prosecution may be forced to bestow some favor blindly. Its
selection of the person to favor may be disastrous from its point of view. It
may immunize a client who has little to contribute but who thereby receives
protection from prosecution. It may immunize or offer a favorable plea
bargain to the client who is most culpable. The latter error may give counsel's
other clients a tactical advantage at trial: they can contrast their lesser
complicity against that of the immunized client in the hope of jury nullification, or they can attack the credibility of the immunized
client through his
4
complicity and receipt of governmental favor. '
Of course, in approaching counsel's clients to offer a bargain, the government has precipitated a conflict. Counsel should withdraw from representing
all clients at that point. 42 If he must select the client who will be favored, he
has a conflict with his other clients. If the government selects the client
without counsel's assistance, counsel probably must still withdraw, since he
almost surely has information from that client which he must use to the
benefit of his other clients. But, if counsel must withdraw, he has nonetheless
forced the government to make the first move-a move that has maximized
the position of one of the clients and probably advanced the position of the
others as well.
Likewise, even if the government does not blindly offer something to any
client, it may still be forced to act in a way that helps counsel's clients. If, for
example, the government argues, in support of a motion to disqualify, that a
conflict exists because one of counsel's clients is a target, or because counsel
himself is the target, or because one of the counsel's clients will implicate his
co-clients if he testifies truthfully once immunized, the government should be
forced to disclose the information that substantiates that claim. In a number
of cases, however, the government has simply asserted that a conflict existed
43
during an ex parte proceeding with the judge supervising the grand jury.
41. The government's argument that extension of blind offers of immunity might diminish the

credibility of an otherwise credible witness has been rejected as a ground for disqualification of counsel. See
In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 609 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that if
witness were an accomplice, defendant would be entitled to cautionary instruction even if witnesses were
not immunized).
42. Most attorneys have withdrawn or offered to withdraw if the government did identify the target
status of counsel's clients or did offer favors to one but not to another. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183,
1191 (2d Cir. 1977) (client told court he would seek separate representation if government revealed how his

testimony would incriminate co-clients); In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d
Cir. 1976) (counsel said he would withdraw if conflict developed; none of his clients immunized; he had
refused to represent union); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976) (counsel withdrew from
representation of target; disqualified nonetheless); Petitioner's Brief For Certiorari at 13, Pirillo v. Takiff,
423 U.S. 1083 (1976) (dismissing appeal and denying certiorari); cf In re Special February 1977 Grand

Jury, 581 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1978) (counsel continued to represent immunized and nonimmunized clients,
but no showing that former would implicate the latter); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818
(W.D. Pa. 1977) (counsel withdrew from representing several clients who were promised nonprosecution,
but disqualified from continuing to represent one such client who attempted to waive conflict, affTd per
curiam by equally divided court, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
43. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975),
affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). In re
Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977), presents an
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The government refused to share that information with the defense to permit
counsel and his clients to assess whether a conflict did exist and whether any
client wanted separate representation based on that information. If the
government is required to disclose the bases of its assertion, 44 that disclosure
may help counsel's clients enormously. They then may learn the identity of
the targets, the direction of the grand jury investigation, the part the
government expects each client to play in the investigation, and the evidence
as to each.
The clients can maintain a united front more easily if all are represented by
one attorney than if each is represented separately. A single attorney
representing all clients can act as the funnel through which flows all
communication among the clients and with the prosecutor. Maintaining a
united front with separate representation is possible only if each attorney and
his client knows who the other attorneys are and trusts that they will
cooperate. But with separate representation, no attorney can be certain that
he has received from other counsel all information that he thinks necessary to
evaluate his single client's position. 45 And unless an attorney believes that he
is receiving complete information from the other attorneys, he must weigh the
risks of noncooperation with the prosecution differently than he might if he
controlled all communication among the targets and witnesses and with the
prosecutor. Game theory is instructive. Studies suggest that imperfect
communication among those faced with possible jeopardy pressures each to
seek and to settle for less than he might have obtained if all had cooperated."
The "Prisoner's Dilemma" is an example.4 7 X and Y each has two choices: to
interesting parallel. There, defense counsel, who himself was a target of the investigation, and the
prosecutor agreed that counsel's clients should be interviewed by the judge in camera without either
attorney being present.
44. Compare In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977) (government must disclose basis of assertion
that conflict exists to enable informed waiver of conflict by witness) with Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341
A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1083 (1976) (disclosure not required because of government interest in secrecy). Whether the government
must disclose is a different issue from the question of which side bears the burden of establishing whether a
conflict existed, whether the witnesses properly invoked the fifth amendment, and whether the witnesses
would have invoked the fifth amendment even if separately represented. Because I believe that the
government bears the burden on these issues and that the clients have the right to waive the conflict, I think
that the government should be required to disclose so that the clients have an opportunity to make an
informed and voluntary waiver. See SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (before excluding
counsel from questioning by SEC staff of his clients, SEC must adduce '"concrete evidence' that his
presence would obstruct or impede its investigation").
45. Although defense counsel frequently try to cooperate by pooling information and dividing motion
practice, see GRAND JURY DEFENSE OFFICE, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF
WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES § 3.6(a)-(b) at 18 (2d ed. 1976), this is not always possible,
when, for example, documents are subpoenaed from different places. See Smaltz, Tactical Considerations
for Effective RepresentationDuring a Government Investigation, 16 Am.CRIM. L. REV. 383, 415-19 (1979).
Also, separately represented witnesses may have greater trouble resisting prosecutorial entreaty or threat.
Cf.Glanzer Address, supranote 23 (describing the prosecutor's "tree-shaking" letter-notifying the client
of conduct that must be explained-and the "life-boat" letter-warning the client that someone else will
cooperate if he does not).
46. E.g., E. MCGINNIES, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 412-19 (1970).
47. Id. at 417-19. The "Prisoner's Dilemma," an example of a zero-sum game in which X will win and Y
will lose, or the reverse, is similar to a grand jury investigation when counsel's clients possess the
incriminating information. In exchange for favor from the prosecutor, either Client A or Client B will
testify and damn the other. The same is true if Client A is a "subject" and Client B is a "target," see note 29
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confess or not to confess. The result of either decision in terms of punishment
is different depending upon the other person's choice. 48 If neither knows what
the other will do, each may rationally choose a course of conduct-to
confess-that results in personal punishment less than the worst possibility
but greater than the optimal. The result would differ if both had greater
information about what the other intended to do and if both trusted that the
other would act as agreed. They would then both refuse to confess, thereby
minimizing the punishment for both. The "Prisoner's Dilemma" suggests
that, as long as each client does not want to cooperate unless he must,4 9 single
50
counsel may maximize the possibility that all of his clients will benefit.
In two other ways, multiple representation may impede if not block an
investigation of an organization and its members. 51 First, even if the
government does succeed in disqualifying counsel, counsel can delay the
investigation by appealing the disqualification order. 52 Second, the prosecutor, before commencing a formal grand jury investigation, frequently informally seeks information from the employees or members. 53 When the
organization's counsel learns of that informal investigation, he may notify the
prosecutor that the latter may not speak to any employee unless counsel is
present. Counsel asserts that, as attorney for the organization, he represents all
of its members. Thus, by approaching any employee, the prosecutor, counsel
argues, will violate Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) or 7-104(A)(2) of the ABA

supra, although the pressure on Client A to cooperate may be less here, while the pressure on Client B will
be greater (nonetheless, a proffer by Client B may disclose his involvement to the prosecution which then
will refuse to offer anything in return for his cooperation).
48. McGinnies assumes the following punishments for X and Y, depending upon what each does: if
neither confesses, each will receive a sentence of one year; if both confess, each will receive a sentence of
eight years; if one confesses and one refuses, the confessor will receive a sentence of 6 months and the
nonconfessor a sentence of 20 years. Id. at 417. Thus, X and Ywill maximize their joint position by refusing
to confess. But, the decision not to confess carries the risk of subjecting the nonconfessor to the worst
sentence, if the other does confess. On the other hand, X can maximize his individual position by
confessing, if Y does not. But if Y has also tried to maximize his personal position, his decision to confess
will result in a higher sentence-eight years-for each.
49. That is, he will not testify unless immunized.
50. The "Dilemma" also suggests why counsel should not continue to represent X and Y if the
prosecutor is willing to offer favor to either in exchange for his testimony against the other.
51. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has expressed concern over investigative
delays resulting from multiple representation of grand jury witnesses. Deputy Director of Operations
Favretto warned that the Division will increase its vigilance of multiple representation during grand jury
investigations. Favretto Address to Chicago Bar, supra note I, at 12. The Department of Justice advocates
an absolute prohibition of multiple representation before grand juries, rather than the removal of attorneys
who unduly delay or impede the grand jury proceedings, as proposed by one bill. Hearings on H.R. 94,
supra note 3, at 723-25 (testimony of Benjamin R. Civiletti, then Ass't Att y Gen., U.S. Dep't. of Justice).
52. The clients, defense counsel, and the prosecutor each has standing to appeal immediately. E.g., In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 605 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (counsel may appeal);
In reSpecial February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1978) (government may appeal).
See United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 272 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that counsel should have
appealed, not violated, order if dissatisfied with disqualification; contempt of counsel affirmed).
53. Several prosecutors told me that they were more worried about this defense ploy than about multiple
representation once a formal grand jury investigation had begun.

1980]

MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION

315

Code of Professional Responsibility.m If applicable, 55 those disciplinary rules
will block the prosecutor from informally approaching any employee and
56
perhaps from speaking to any employee who approaches him voluntarily. If
the prosecutor cannot take these initial investigative steps to determine
whether a crime was committed and by whom, he may decide that a formal
grand jury investigation is not warranted. This variant of multiple representation then will have succeeded.
Another important advantage of multiple representation is in minimizing
the cost of legal assistance. The claim that multiple representation is a defense
attorney's "dream" because it will result in higher fees is too cynical in many
instances. 57 True, in a protracted investigation, counsel's fees may be very
large. Attorneys usually do not represent clients in grand jury investigations
inexpensively. Many charge a fee in the neighborhood of $100 per hour; few
charge a flat fee, 58 as is the customary practice in representing a client after
indictment, at least when he is charged with astreet crime. But that hourly fee
54. Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or
cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to
be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so; (2) Give advice to a person who
is not represented by a lawyer, other than advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1978) (footnotes omitted).
55. The applicability of these two disciplinary rules in the grand jury context is as yet undetermined.
Compare Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1976) (prosecutor may
not ethically approach any client to discuss immunity without counsel's knowledge) with United States v.
Turkish, 470 F. Supp. 903, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (prosecutor can inform clients of conflict problem,
although he should do so in counsel's presence). Their applicability is problematic. Disciplinary Rule 7104(AXI) may not require the prosecutor to notify counsel for two reasons. First, the Rule appears to
assume communication during on-going litigations; because the grand jury has issued no indictments, no
one may be opposed formally by the prosecutor. Second, application of the Rule to all employees of the
entity would probably overly restrict prosecutorial investigation. See In re FMC Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1108
(S.D. W. Va. 1977) (government not barred from interviewing corporation's employees as long as
employees informed of right to counsel); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS,
No. 1410 (Feb. 14, 1978) (proper to interview any employee other than those who could bind corporation
without notifying corporation's counsel). INFORMAL OPINION No. 1410 appears to bar the prosecutor
from approaching top-level employees who are the most likely to possess important information.
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(2) also appears to restrict prosecutorial communication with any employee
who might be a target or subject of the investigation because such a "person" has an interest in conflict
with that of the government, although the proper interpretation of "advice" is still unsettled. See
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESONSIBILrrY 340-41 (1979).
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) does prevent the prosecutor from communicating an offer of any type to
the client, even if he believes that counsel has not informed his client of that offer. See ABA COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1373 (Dec. 2, 1976) (improper to send copies of plea
offer to counsel's clients).
56. Prosecutors appear reluctant to test their authorization for fear that counsel will ask a disciplinary
board to investigate the ethics of questioning an employee in counsel's absence.
57. See Cole, supra note 3, at 153. In fact, in several instances, counsel reported that they charged
nothing. In an investigation of political conduct, for example, attorneys frequently told me that the
question was whether they were sympathetic to the politics of the potential clients rather than whether the
clients could pay a fee.
58. Several attorneys reported, however, that they charged a fee of $250-$500 per day while assisting a
witness as he testified.
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is sometimes charged against all clients rather than against each separately;
hence, the cost to each client may be considerably less than it would be if he
were to retain separate counsel. 59 Also, it may be easier for clients to organize
a defense fund to raise money if all are represented by a single attorney. 60 And
many attorneys fear that a labor union or small corporation that has agreed to
provide counsel for its members who are witnesses or targets 6' will face
bankruptcy if it must pay for separate counsel for each. In In re Investigation
Before April 1975 Grand Jury,6 2 for example, the estimated cost to the
Pressmen's Union of paying for separate counsel for the 100-plus members
who were subpoenaed would have approached $200,000.63 Moreover, the
government, although it has frequently voiced a demand for separate counsel,
has apparently never suggested that the judge supervising the grand jury
investigation should appoint counsel to assist any indigent witness or target. 64
Finally, even if there exists an adequate pool of capable attorneys to
provide separate representation for defendants charged with street crime,
there may not be as many attorneys with experience in sophisticated grand
jury investigation work. 65 An attorney inexperienced in federal prosecution
may not assist a single client as well as might an experienced attorney saddled
with a conflict. 66 Interestingly, many defense counsel in white-collar crime
cases are former members of a United States Attorney's office. That
experience may give them a tactical edge that other defense attorneys may
lack. They may have more insight into how the government develops its case,
how important certain information is for the investigation, and how likely it is
that the prosecutor will offer a favorable disposition in exchange for
cooperation or in spite of the failure to offer to cooperate.
IV. THE DOCTRINAL GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The government's motives in moving to disqualify must necessarily appear
mixed. On the one hand, the motion appears self-serving. 67 By eliminating
59. If counsel prepares the same motion on behalf of all clients (a wiretap disclosure motion, for
example), the per-client charge will be less if apportioned among all.
60. This was reported by several attorneys. On the other hand, a group of attorneys might be better able
than a single attorney to help raise money for the fund because they would be able to appear at more
fundraising events.
61. Of course, there may be a problem of proper expenditure of union or corporate funds if the officer
were a target.
62. 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
63. Estimate by counsel. The district court's order forbade representation by any attorney of more than
one subpoenaed union member, In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176, 1183
(D.D.C. 1975), an order that several attorneys understood to prohibit two attorneys of the same firm from
each representing a separate union member.
. 64. This criticism was expressed by several attorneys. There is some question, however, as to whether
the court is authorized to appoint counsel before indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1976) (ordering
each district court to adopt plan for appointment of counsel for indigents who, inter alia, are charged with
felony or misdemeanor, who are under arrest when representation is required by law or who are
constitutionally entitled to representation).
. 65. This is the claim of many attorneys. But see In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F.
Supp. 1176, 1182 (D.D.C. 1975) (union members could choose from "limitless pool of qualified attorneys
in the District of Columbia"), vacated on other grounds, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
66. A conflict might not impede counsel from making the many motions available to challenge the
grand jury's jurisdiction or its subpoenas.
67. A self-serving factor impelling the government to disqualify counsel is probably its use of the grand
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counsel, the government hopes to obtain more information, and to obtain it
without conceding favor in return. On the other hand, the government is
obliged to "seek justice" 68 and to police the conduct of counsel. The former
broad ethical directive probably includes an obligation to protect the interests
of the witnesses and targets by informing them of the risk they run by not
cooperating and by retaining a single attorney to represent them all. 69 The
latter probably includes the obligation to notify the court whenever the
prosecutor believes that counsel
is violating a disciplinary rule of the Code of
70
Professional Responsibility.
The government has advanced two doctrinal justifications for disqualification. First, multiple representation impedes the grand jury's investigation;
second, multiple representation constitutes an unethical act that mandates
judicial sanction against counsel by way of disqualification. 7 1 It might also
advance a third justification: disqualification is necessary to protect against
jury to investigate political dissidence and white-collar crime. In this context, the prosecutor may be under
extreme pressure to complete the investigation successfully. In Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 512, 341 A.2d
896, 898 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1083 (1976), for example, the Governor, following publication of a report by a state commission, had
appointed a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute alleged police corruption in Philadelphia. In
other instances the prosecutor wants to carry through with an investigation that he himself has originated.
See WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FORCE, REPORT 34 (1975) (prosecutor usually initiates whitecollar crime probe). Critics of the grand jury argue that the grand jury in the last 10 years has been used to
obtain information for intelligence purposes as well as when federal investigators are blocked by
constitutional restrictions. See Hearings on S. 3405 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary.95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978) (testimony of Morton
Stavis, Esq., Center for Constitutional Rights) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 3405]; id. at 37
(testimony of Judy Mead, National Lawyers Guild). The value of a grand jury to investigate is obvious:
whereas the police have no subpoena power and cannot search unless fourth amendment requirements are
satisfied, the grand jury may issue subpoenas to testify or produce documents almost without restriction.
Hence, when, as in white-collar crime investigations, the government suspects "X" but does not know what
"X" has done, the grand jury provides an invaluable way of circumventing constitutional restrictions on
the police. If the prosecutor suspects that counsel's multiple representation has thwarted the investigation,
he is tempted to move to disqualify. See Hearingson H.R. 94, supra note 3, at 672 (statement by Patrick
Tobin, Washington Representative Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union). However, no court
has as yet scored the prosecutor's motives in moving to disqualify, as has happened in the civil context. See
Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977) (critical of motions to disqualify opposing counsel in civil
litigation as prompted by strategic considerations).
68. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-13 (1978).
69. Cf. SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (dictum) (SEC has duty to inform parties of
attorney's possible conflicts); United States v. Turkish, 470 F. Supp. 903, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dictum)
(prosecution should have notified client of possible conflict in counsel's simultaneous representation of
another). Notifying counsel's clients is difficult because of the uncertain restrictions of Disciplinary Rule 7104. See notes 54-55 supra. As a result, several prosecutors said that they first attempted to alert counsel
that he might have a conflict; this effort frequently proved unsuccessful because counsel distrusted the
prosecutor's motives. In Turkish the prosecutor eventually notified the client, in counsel's presence, that a
potential conflict existed. 470 F. Supp. at 910.
70. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1976); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) ("A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation
of DR 1-102 [concerning "misconduct" by another attorney] shall report such knowledge to a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.") (footnote omitted).
71. So that neither counsel nor court could miss this second basis, one prosecutor described his motion
to disqualify as a "Motion to Disqualify or in the Alternative to Disbar or Suspend From Practice."
Conversation with former Assistant United States Attorney Robert B. Amidon (Jan. 16, 1980). The
motion was so styled for two reasons: first, as a basis to argue that the government need not prove prejudice
to its position as a predicate to disqualify; and, second, to influence the court to disqualify as a lesser
sanction. Id.
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later constitutional attack by any of counsel's clients on the investigation or
on the conviction.
The first values the investigation as paramount to the right of the clients to
select counsel and to impede the investigation in whatever way is legally
available. The second values the ethical obligations of counsel as paramount
to the desires of his clients who themselves do not object to counsel's

continued representation. Each of the three arguments presents conceptual
and proof problems for the government, and none is persuasive.
A. MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE
INVESTIGATION

One could easily reject as a proper ground for multiple representation the
obstruction of an effective grand jury investigation that constitutes a principal
tactical advantage of multiple representation. After all, the grand jury is
frequently the best, if not the only, available way for the government to
investigate criminal conduct. 72 The social value in not deterring the grand
jury's work may explain why the Supreme Court has not permitted individuals to invoke other rights which would block or delay the collection of
information by the grand jury. 73 Not surprisingly, then, the government has
urged repeatedly that counsel should be disqualified because multiple representation impedes the grand jury's work.
The government's argument takes various forms. Defense counsel, assumed to recognize the nature and effect of a conflict, is also assumed to have
structured his representation in a way to avoid the conflict. Hence, counsel
has not approached the prosecution with an offer to have Client A cooperate
because that offer would compromise Client B's position. Or, counsel has
advised his clients to invoke the fifth amendment when in fact one or more of
them would incur no risk by testifying. That advice is supposedly spurred by
counsel's desire to avoid a conflict if Client A were to testify in a way that
would undercut Client B's position.74 If the clients were separately represent72. Of course, this point overlooks the oft-expressed objection to an investigatory grand jury: the
government should not be permitted to use the greater power of the grand jury, which can issue subpoenas
and bypass fourth amendment challenges, to assist a police investigation blocked by constitutional
considerations.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness subpoenaed before grand jury
cannot raise fourth amendment objections); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (first amendment
does not protect against disclosure of confidential news sources); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273
(1919) (witness cannot challenge constitutionality of statute whose alleged violation grand jury was
investigating).
74. The argument is not that counsel has advised his clients to invoke the privilege but rather that the
conflict may affect counsel's decision as to whether and how to advise his clients to invoke the privilege. See
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273, 276-78 (E.D. Mich. 1976). This argument would result in
the automatic disqualification of any attorney who simultaneously represented a target and a nontarget
witness. In disqualifying counsel in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the court went too far. It found an actual
conflict of interest based on the government's assertion that four of counsel's clients would be asked
questions about the subject of the investigation, also represented by counsel. It criticized counsel, who
represented the Teamsters Union, for representing four members of the Union during a grand jury
investigation of James Hoffa's disappearance. And it rejected the waiver by the four witnesses of the right
to effective representation as superseded by the public's interest in an effective investigation. The court
improperly assumed that the four witnesses possessed information which might damage the subject, and it
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ed, so the argument goes, each would be fully informed of the cost-benefit
ratio in cooperating or not cooperating. If the clients were fully informed, the
prosecutor could more intelligently decide to whom to grant immunity or a
favorable plea bargain-separate counsel would make proffers to explain the
assistance that his single client might provide.
Because the client has but a due process or first amendment right to retain
counsel, 75 the government has argued that the importance of the investigation
is a factor to be juxtaposed against the client's flexible right to select counsel.
Several courts have accepted this argument and have concluded that counsel
should be disqualified. 76 The argument does not persuade, at least without77
factual proof of the type that has been successfully adduced in only one case.
This argument misperceives the purpose of counsel's representation and of
his clients' invocation of the fifth amendment. While the grand jury may be
entitled to every person's testimony, counsel's objective is not to aid the grand
jury but to protect his clients. In several instances, 78 the government has
baldly argued that the failure of defense counsel to approach the government
justifies disqualification. In effect, the government expects the defense to
make the first move in the draw poker analogy. But counsel is not obliged to
make a proffer; 79 nor must his clients cooperate even if that would appear to
be in the best interest of each. The government, as a result, may be forced to
offer a favorable plea bargain or immunity, even if blindly, in order to force
the issue. Several defense counsel have asserted that they would withdraw
once the government has extended such an offer 80-again suggesting that
overlooked the fact that counsel offered his services without pay to the four New Jersey witnesses who were
subpoenaed before a Michigan grand jury. The decision suggests that counsel may be disqualified if
disqualification might expedite an otherwise frustrated investigation (especially when the investigation
concerns a highly publicized, politically sensitive issue). The disqualification order was not appealed when
counsel was unable to obtain a stay of the order pending appeal.
75. Eg., Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11,
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). The argument based on the first amendment is
advanced by members of a labor union who have joined together in part to obtain legal assistance. See id.
76. See In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977);
In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per
curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
77. In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977)
(government disclosed to court that counsel was target).
78. E.g., In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (D.D.C. 1975),
vacated on other grounds, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
79. As one district court judge wrote, "An attorney would be derelict in his duty of representation if he
did not try to impede the Grand Jury investigation through lawful means." In re Grand Jury Investigation,
436 F. Supp. 818, 822 n.14 (W.D. Pa.) (nonetheless disqualifying counsel), affd per curiam by equally
divided court, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). That quotation as well
as my textual assertion assumes, of course, that counsel's proper role is to advance the position of his clients
rather than society's general interest in a successful grand jury investigation. Those courts that have
disqualified counsel by valuing the importance of the investigation over the clients' choice of an attorney
have implicitly rejected this view of counsel's role as proper. I do not intend to discuss this question here.
Compare Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976) (counsel serves society indirectly by serving his client directly) with SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (SEC takes position that counsel must disclose
privileged information if nondisclosure would damage investing public). See generally Simon, The Ideology
of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wisc. L. REV. 29.
80. E.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536
F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976); Pirillo v. TakifL 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187,
352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
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defense attorneys are acting in accord with the draw poker analogy. Only
when the government first makes the offer, then demonstrates that counsel's
conflict led him not to discuss the offer his clients or to advise his clients
to refuse to testify, even if immunized, has the government established the
factual predicate that justifies disqualification. 81
The government has also asserted that the client has invoked the privilege
solely because of multiple representation.8 2 To prove that assertion-that
with separate representation the client would not invoke the privilege-may
prove to be an impossible burden. The client cannot be expected to retain
separate counsel, and it is unlikely that the court would appoint separate
counsel to determine whether, with individual advice, the client would elect to
testify. 83 And without that separate advice, it is unrealistic to expect the client
to admit that but for multiple representation he would not invoke the
privilege. Moreover, it does not follow that disqualification is proper even
where separate representation would cause a client to testify in a case where
he would not testify if jointly represented. Instead, the government's option is
to test whether the client has properly invoked the privilege-to
protect
84
himself when he risks exposure rather than to protect others.
B. MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION AS A VIOLATION BY COUNSEL OF HIS

ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES

This governmental argument to disqualify represents a shift in emphasis
from whatever right the grand jury has to obtain information to counsel's
81. Arguably, counsel should also be disqualified if the prosecutor tells counsel that he will favor one of
counsel's clients but not both, and leaves to counsel the determination of which client will receive that
benefit. Counsel obviously cannot choose which client will receive that favor and probably cannot even
discuss with both which is more likely to benefit. Moreover, although both clients could decide to refuse to
make a proffer or to bargain for favor, each may overly influence the other to make that decision if counsel
discusses the question with each simultaneously.
82. See In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Attorneys
report that district court judges have frequently appeared upset that counsel's clients have invoked the fifth
amendment, without regard for whether that invocation appeared proper or whether the clients would
have invoked the privilege if separately represented. See id.; Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 516, 341 A.2d
896, 899 (1975) (implicitly accepting government's characterization of invocation of privilege by all 12
clients as "conspiratorial 'stonewall.'), affd per curiam. 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); cf. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 455 (1975) (trial court, which found
attorney in contempt for advising client to invoke fifth amendment, "appear[ed] to have been offended" by
that advice; contempt citation reversed). To disqualify because the clients have invoked the privilege is
wrong. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. Slochower v. Bd. of Education, 350 U.S.
551 (1956) (cannot fire teacher for invocation of fifth amendment). As a result, the government has shifted
its argument from an implied criticism of the invocation of the privilege to a claim that counsel cannot
properly inform his clients about when they may or should invoke the privilege. See note 74 supra.
83. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 436 F. Supp. 818, 821 n. 11 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (when
government offers "any type of immunity," different counsel should advise client about option), affd per
curiam by equally divided court, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); but cf
United States v. Villarreal, 554 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 802 (1977) (court took notice
of the propriety of appointing separate counsel after the charge to advise defendants concerning conflict
issues). Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the clients would discuss the issue with separate counsel. See Tague,
supra note 22, at 1099 (noting affidavits filed by clients in Watergate case in opposition to government's
request that each retain separate counsel).
84. See In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977);
In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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violation of his ethical responsibilities to represent his clients in accord with
Canons 5 and 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. No doubt the
prosecutor is himself ethically obliged to notify the court of counsel's
apparent ethical viQlation, even if to date prosecutors have ironically done so
only. when counsel's multiple representation denied them information they
needed for a successful investigation.
A threshold question with this argument is whether a federal court has
authority to disqualify counsel for his apparent or actual violation of the
Code. Not all federal district courts have adopted the Code, their own ethical
code, or the ethical rules of the state in which they sit. Nonetheless, the courts
believe that they can oversee counsel's conduct because counsel owes them a
fictional responsibility as an "officer of the court. '85 They thus may deny
counsel the opportunity to appear pro hac vice8 6 or may disqualify counsel
who is licensed to practice in the jurisdiction.
A second question, however, is whether the court may disqualify when
either counsel has not clearly violated a disciplinary rule 87 or his clients are
prepared to waive the effect of any apparent or actual violation; or whether
the court may disqualify only when counsel has clearly violated a disciplinary
rule and his clients will not or cannot waive the effect of that violation. The
courts have not specifically addressed this question, but their answer is
implicit in the decisions. Those courts that have disqualified have assumed
that they may disqualify "to nip any conflict in the bud"88 and that the clients
may not waive. The government obviously benefits from this judicial
interventionism and paternalism.8 9 Those courts that have refused to disquali85. See Hirschkopf v. Sneed, 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th
Cir. 1976). There isa growing concern, however, that courts should not disqualify counsel for X without a
showing of prejudice to Y, and should leave the question of sanctioning X's counsel for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to bar groups. See Comden v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 906, 919, 576 P.2d
971,978, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 16 (1979) (Manuel, J., dissenting) (criticizing disqualification of attorney who
might be called as a witness).
86. See In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Inl. 1975) (nonetheless
admitting counsel to practice).
87. There is no clear answer. Broad statements that courts possess the inherent authority to discipline
counsel do not resolve the question of whether exercise of that authority should be guided by, if not limited
to, enforcement of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. Compare In re Special February 1977
Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusing to reverse denial of disqualification motion
"absent a clear showing of either an actual conflict of interests or a grave danger of such a conflict which
would impede the proper functioning of the grand jury") with In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 406
F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (apparently willing to test counsel's conduct by Ethical Considerations of
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility concerning conflicts; no disqualification because no violation
thereof). Disqualification in this context also presents the question of the relevancy of Canon 9 of the Code,
especially Disciplinary Rule 9-101 ("Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety"). That rule, which is
the common basis for disqualification in civil litigation, has rarely been advanced as a basis to disqualify in
the grand jury context. But see In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. at 196 (rejecting
government's argument: "[t]he Court finds it hard to conceive of how the multiple representation by
[counsel] is, by itself, improper or before whom any assumed impropriety would even appear"). Nor should
it be: in the civil context, disqualification is usually based on counsel's earlier representation of the
opponent of his current client. Such iepresentation usually provided counsel with access to privileged
information about the former client from which counsel might now profit-a situation that obviously does
not exist in the grand jury context.
88. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976). But cf.In re Special February 1977 Grand
Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Gopman with approval, but rejecting government's
argument to adopt per se rule to disqualify whenever potential for conflict exists).
89. Cf.In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (disqualifying counsel by
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fy have demanded proof that a conflict does exist (with the government
shouldering that burden; counsel has not been required to demonstrate the
nonexistence of a potential or actual conflict), 90 and that the clients have not
waived the effect of any conflict (with counsel and his clients shouldering this
burden). 91 If the government may demand a hearing at whicWboth counsel
and his clients must aver, if not testify, as to the communications between
counsel and his clients about the conflict issue, and as to the understanding
and desires of the clients, then the government may also profit even from the
more reserved of these judicial approaches, as I hope to show in the next
section.
Counsel may violate his ethical obligations92under either Canon 5 or Canon
6 while representing more than one client.
1. Canon 5
The disciplinary rules of Canon 5 outlaw conflicts of interest. Counsel may
have three conflict problems. First, he may have a direct conflict with his
clients because he is a target of the investigation, either along with or apart
from his clients. When this conflict exists, counsel should be disqualified
whenever his clients may be witnesses to his alleged criminal conduct.
Counsel's advice reeks of self-service: no attorney would commit legal suicide
overriding client's attempt to waive conflict as uninformed), affjd per curiam by an equally divided court,
576 F.2d 1071, 1072 (3d Cir.) (en banc) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
90. See In re January 1974 Special Investigating Grand Jury, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 246, 361 A.2d 325
(1976) (to establish grounds to disqualify, government may present affidavits summarizing testimony of
witnesses who need not themselves testify). Courts have also demanded that the government prove other
facts as a condition of disqualification: proof that the clients would not invoke the fifth amendment if
separately represented, In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 607 (D.C. Cir.
1976); proof that the immunized clients would incriminate the nonimmunized clients, In re Special
February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1978); proof that counsel's advice was contrary to the
client's best interest, would not have been given by a different attorney, or was given to obstruct justice, In
re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Were the government obliged
to demonstrate a conflict between a target organization and its members-by showing that the members
wanted to resist but the organization wanted them to cooperate in order to thrust responsibility on
them-the government probably could never prevail. Cf In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 1976)
(Clark, J., dissenting). In contrast to these decisions the government has argued that there should be a
presumption against multiple representation which, if accepted, would probably place the burden to show
no conflict on the defense. See Favretto Address to Chicago Bar, supra note 1, at 15.
This allocation of the burden of proof at the grand jury stage contrasts sharply with that allocation after
conviction, where the defendant usually must prove conflict and prejudice. See Tague, supra note 22, at
1088-91.
91. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1181, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977) (no disqualification unless Disciplinary Rule 5105(D) violated).
92. The conflict problem also creates tension with counsel's obligations under Canon 4 to protect the
confidences of each client. Client A might, for example, reveal something that magnifies his exposure in
contrast to Client B's or that exonerates Client B, or Client A may discuss his testimony before the grand
jury (information which might assist Client B when he testifies, in minimizing his exposure or in placing
responsibility on Client A). Because any witness before a federal grand jury may disclose his testimony,
counsel may be obliged to pressure Client A, after he testifies, to waive his personal attorney-client privilege
to permit counsel to inform Client B, to whom counsel owes a duty to inform. But, at the same time,
counsel owes a duty to Client A not to represent him in a way that might injure his position to the
advantage of Client B. One attorney was disqualified on the basis of Canon 4, although without proof that
Client A would testify in a way that might injure Client B. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
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by advising93his clients to cooperate fully with an investigation that could
damn him.
Second, counsel may appear to have a conflict in that he wants to collect a
large fee from each of his clients. 94 To reap the fee, he thus structures his
representation to avoid the conflict. This is the objection advanced by one oftcited commentator. 95 It is probably baseless in almost every situation. 96 True,
to avoid the appearance of a conflict bottomed on payment of fees by a third
party, attorneys sometimes require each client to pay personally. 97 But those
attorneys usually charge each client a fee less than that which they would
charge a single client. Also, some attorneys charge a high rate for representing
all of the clients, but expect the clients to apportion that charge among
themselves. And counsel has himself occasionally retained an attorney to
order rather than demand that his
press the appeal of his disqualification
98
clients pay for the appeal.
The third type of conflict is the more usual. It is the conflict among his
clients that compromises or threatens to compromise counsel's representation
of each. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: "In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a
lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after
full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of
his independent professional judgment on behalf of each." 99 One conceptual
93. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 5-101 ("Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment").
94. See id., Ethical Consideration 5-7 (counsel should not "become financially interested in the outcome
of the litigation").
95. Cole, supra note 3.
96. Counsel in the three cases cited by Cole, id., were apparently not motivated by the prospect of a large
fee. In Pirilloand Gopman counsel had a preexisting employment contract with a labor union to represent
its members. In the latter, counsel also withdrew from representation of target members of the union. In
the third, In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976), counsel was
hired by a union to represent its members, in part because hiring separate attorneys would have cost an
exorbitant amount.
97. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1976). There,
counsel deliberately demanded that each client pay the fee separately to eliminate the appearance of
possible control by a third party over his or his clients' conduct, an important reason supporting the
disqualification in Pirillo. Many defense attorneys believe payment by a third party to be a false problem
and intend to accept payment from such a source in the future, as long as they notify the clients of that
source and notify the source that they will advance the interests of the clients. See ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Disciplinary Rule 5-107(A) & (B) (with consent of client, counsel can
accept payment from third party, as long as he does not permit the payor to "direct or regulate his
professional judgment in rendering such legal services").
98. See In re Special February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d
262 (5th Cir. 1976). Counsel himself has standing to appeal because a disqualification order is directed at
him and is at least an implicit finding that he acted unethically. See In re Investigation Before April 1975
Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 606 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
99. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) provides:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing
interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C). [footnotes omitted].
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlILrry, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) states the same mandate for
counsel who has already accepted employment.
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problem must be hurdled to disqualify on the basis of DR 5-105(C). What is
the "interest" of each client? Courts have assumed, as DR 5-105(A) and (B)
also apparently do, that "interest" must be defined as if counsel represented
each client alone. But, as discussed in Part III, the "interest" of each client
during a grand jury investigation may not be to further his personal interest in
the way usually understood. Each client's "interest" may be to deny
himself-and his co-clients-the opportunity to act alone. To oppose the
investigation, each client may choose to forfeit the path that might appear to
advance his personal interest-the opportunity to cooperate. As long as each
client understands that that is his "interest," and all agree to work together
through single counsel to achieve that "interest," counsel should not be
disqualified if his "independent professional judgment" is that this united
approach will benefit each individually and all collectively.
Also, DR 5-105(C) provides that the clients may waive the effect of a
conflict. Courts are divided over whether the clients may waive either a
potential or an actual conflict.100 An important, and as yet unsettled question,
is whether a court could sanction counsel through disqualification independent of the desires of his clients. Assuming, however, that the clients can
waive, 101 and that their waiver supersedes the judicial authority to disqualify
counsel, 102 the determination of whether they fully understand the conflict
issue is difficult. This determination involves both potential benefit and risk to
the clients. The government should be required to disclose the information it
has that leads the prosecutor to believe that a conflict exists. Several courts
have permitted the prosecutor to make this disclosure in camera. 103 In camera
disclosure is wrong: the information should be given to counsel and his clients
for their appraisal. 104 Once informed, the clients may nonetheless deny that
the information is true, that it can be proven or that it creates a conflict. 105
And if that information does induce counsel to withdraw or does convince
100. Compare In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (waiver permitted) with In re
Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. 1132, 1139-40 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (waiver of potential but not actual conflict); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273, 278 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (clients' waiver of effective
representation does not include waiver of society's interest in grand jury investigation) and Pirillo v. Takiff,
462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 611 (trial court rejected attempt
by clients to waive, according to defense counsel) appealdismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
101. I believe they can. If two defendants can waive even an actual conflict at trial, see, e.g., Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5 (1978) (dictum) ("defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an
attorney unhindered by a conflict of interest"); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978), I
see no reason to countermand the clients' willingness to waive at the pre-charge stage. Of course, because it
may be more difficult for counsel to determine whether a conflict exists before a charge, the clients may not
be able to make an informed waiver. Thus, the question is not whether the clients can waive, but whether
they have made an informed and voluntary waiver.
102. Rather than disqualifying counsel, the court may be left with the option of recommending a
disciplinary inquiry of counsel's conduct. See SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
103. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977) (critical of in camera hearing conducted by district
court); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11,
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). Cf. In re Investigation Before February 1977,
Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977) (both defense counsel and prosecutor waived
presence during in camera hearing conducted by court with counsel's clients).
104. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977); In re 1974 Special Investigating Grand Jury, 241
Pa. Super. Ct. 246, 361 A.2d 325 (1976).
105. See In re Special February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1978) (counsel could
continue to represent both immunized and nonimmunized clients as long as no showing that former would
incriminate latter).
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one or more of his clients to seek separate representation, multiple representation has again aided the clients. They have a better understanding of the
nature of the investigation and of each other's position.
But the waiver determination has its risks as well. The court should
conduct a hearing, and the prosecutor should be permitted to participate. The
prosecutor may want to disclose information that precipitates the conflict. He
may want to question counsel and his clients to ensure that the waiver by each
is both informed and voluntary so that he can eliminate the conflict question
as a subsequent ground for appeal.
Counsel and his clients should be forced to testify as to counsel's
explanation of the conflict problem, as to the clients' understanding of that
problem and of his and their desire to continue with him alone and as to
counsel's belief that his clients can give an informed and adequate waiver. The
questioning should probe deeply into the attorney-client relationship. 06 If the
106. The court should not settle foranaffidavit from each client. See GRAND JURY DEFENSE OFFICE,
supra note 45, Appendix A at 538.25 (Supp. 1979) (sample affidavit). The inquiry should be probing and
should not go beyond asking in summary terms whether each client understands that he can retain separate
counsel, whether each understands the nature of a conflict and its possible effect upon counsel's
representation, and whether each nonetheless wants the same attorney to represent all. A FED. R. CRIM. P.
II type of inquiry (conducted by the court when a defendant pleads guilty), recommended by several
courts, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 446 F. Supp. 1132, 1140 (N.D. Tex. 1978), is inadequate. I suggest that the
inquiry cover the following areas:
1. Choice of counsel: Who chose the attorney? What discussions concerning that selection
occurred among the co-clients? Has each considered whether to retain separate counsel? If so,
and has decided not to do so, why? What is the fee arrangement? Has counsel explained his
obligations if the fee is paid by a third party?
2. Advantages and disadvantages of multiple representation: What advantages and
disadvantages does each foresee for himself and for his co-clients in multiple representation?
What conversations have the clients had among themselves on this issue? What has counsel
suggested about this issue? Did he discuss this issue with each client separately or with all
together?
3. Conflicts: Does each understand the nature of a conflict, the places where one might
exist, the effect of one on counsel's representation and the possibility that counsel might
withdraw in the future because of a conflict? Does each understand what counsel cannot do
because of a conflict? What conversations has each had with his co-clients and with counsel
about the conflict problem? Does each waive the effect of such a conflict? Does each
understand the significance of such a waiver?
4. Independent counselling: Has each discussed what he knows with counsel? With his coclients, either separately or together? Has counsel discussed with each his personal exposure
and that of his co-clients? Has counsel discussed what is in the best interest of each? Does any
desire to speak with separate counsel?
5. Invocation of the fifth amendment: What conversations has each had with counsel and
his co-clients about invoking the fifth amendment if subpoenaed to testify? Why is each
invoking the fifth amendment? Would each invoke the fifth amendment if separately
represented?
6. The attorney-client privilege: Has counsel discussed the nature of the conflict problem
and the grand jury process with the co-clients together? Discussed what each client knows in
the presence of the other(s)? Has counsel asked each to waive the privilege so that he can
discuss with the co-clients what each has told counsel? Has any client withheld information
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clients refuse to answer by invoking the fifth amendment or refuse to permit
counsel to answer by invoking the attorney-client privilege, the court has the
power to disqualify. 107 Without that testimony, the court cannot determine
whether the clients have made an informed and voluntary waiver and whether
counsel has fully and accurately explained the nature and ramifications of a
conflict to them.
But courts have overidden an ostensibly informed and voluntary waiver. In
two cases, courts concluded that the client's allegiance to the entity, whether
or not it paid counsel's fees, rendered the waiver involuntary. 08 Those
decisions, on first inspection, appear wrong. If, as the government has
conceded, the court should not countermand an apparently informed and
voluntary waiver by defendants after they have been charged, 109 courts should
not treat the clients' purported waiver at the grand jury stage with greater
skepticism. But this conclusion may be drawn too quickly. There is a ticklish
problem in determining whether the waiver is informed and voluntary.
Clients have difficulty understanding what a conflict is and what its effect
might be-a difficulty augmented by uncertainty about the direction of the
investigation and their personal exposure to criminal liability. They may be all
too apt to accept counsel's evaluation that no conflict exists, despite the
insistence by the court that one does or soon will. 1 0 Equally important, an
informed client may not be able to give a voluntary waiver. Each client may
feel tremendous peer pressure not to seek separate representation. To retain
separate counsel may be understood as a betrayal by his co-clients, even if in
fact the client simply wants separate assurance that his opposition to the
investigation is the appropriate course for him. Consequently, the client may
fear that by seeking separate counsel he will be ostracized by his co-clients or
may expose himself to physical harm or dismissal from employment. And
from counsel?
7. Status: Does each understand whether he is a target or a witness? Does each understand
why he is a target or what exposure he has? Does each client who is vulnerable to indictment
understand what risks he runs by not attempting to cooperate?
8. Counsel: Counsel should be asked why he wants to represent his clients; whether he
believes a conflict does or may exist; what he has or will do to prevent the emergence of a
conflict or to limit the damage of a conflict; what conversations he has had with his clients
about the conflict issue; whether he believes that each has knowingly and voluntarily waived
the effect of any conflict, and when, if ever, he might withdraw on the ground of a conflict;
and whether he would represent any client differently if he represented each client separately.
107. See Tague, supra note 22, at 1115 & n.249.
108. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd per curiam by equally
divided court, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa.
511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), affd per curiam, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
109. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977). The government's "concession" in Taylor
suggests the self-serving nature of the government's motion to disqualify at the grand jury stage: the
government makes the motion when its interests are endangered (the success of the investigation) but does
not when its interest in a conviction will ordinarily be advanced by multiple representation (post-charge).
110. See United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J. 1977), affd sub nor. Unites States v.
Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978). The problem of determining whether the purported waiver is
informed and voluntary is the reason why advocates of grand jury reform have opposed conditioning grant
of immunity upon consent of the witness. See Hearings on S. 3405, supra note 67, at 8 (testimony of Hon.
Joshua Eilberg).
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that client may in fact have information that would damn his co-clients, but
which he is afraid to reveal to the attorney representing all for fear that the
attorney will then share that information with the co-clients. As a result, the
judicial decision as to whether the clients' waiver is informed and voluntary is
difficult. Courts may err on the side of disqualifying counsel. To prevent
disqualification, counsel and his clients may be forced to submit to searching
inquiry.' 1 Whether counsel and his clients should agree to that is discussed in
Part V.
2. Canon 6
A second basis to disqualify because of a conflict might be counsel's
violation of the directive of Canon 6 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility that "A lawyer should represent a client competently," or of
his duty to interview and investigate as outlined in the ABA Standards
concerning the defense attorney." 2 If, for example, the prosecutor suspects
that counsel has not advanced the interests of Client A in order to protect
Client B, he might move to disqualify on the basis that counsel has not
provided competent representation. 113 Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility, however, does not appear to make that
sort of representation a basis for sanction. The disciplinary rule appears
intended to proscribe an attorney from representing a client when that
attorney lacks the training or experience to provide informed representation.114 In contrast, an attorney who steers his representation at the grand jury
stage in a way designed to protect the interests of all of his clients would
appear to know precisely what he must do. Of course, if at a hearing counsel's
explanation of why he thought multiple representation was appropriate
revealed that he did not understand the nature of the conflict problem in
general or as it applied to the particular case, the court might disqualify.
Also, although there is no express waiver provision included in Canon 6,
the clients should be able to waive Canon 6 protection to the same degree that
they can waive Canon 5 protection. As long5 as they understand the type of
"representation" that counsel can provide," counsel should not be disquali111. I have suggested an intrusive inquiry to ensure that the purported waiver is informed and
voluntary. See note 106 supra.
112. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, §§ 4-3.2 & 4-

4.4 (1979 Approved Draft) (duty to interview clients and duty to investigate, respectively).
113. This objection involves counsel's alleged violation of Canon 6 or of the Defense Standards rather
than of his sixth amendment constitutional duty to provide effective representation. Because an individual
has no pre-charge sixth amendment right to counsel, the prosecutor could not base a motion to disqualify
on the ground of a constitutional violation by counsel of his obligation under the sixth amendment.
Moreover, the prosecutor would not want to claim that a conflict rendered counsel's representation
constitutionally ineffective: such an argument would undercut the prosecutor's claim that the grand jury's
freedom to investigate is an important factor that merits comparison with the client's due process right to
select counsel. See Part IV(l) supra.
114. Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provides, for
example, that an attorney shall not "(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is
not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it." Nor would
counsel violate Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2) if, with the consent of his clients, he elected not to interview
them or to investigate to avoid uncovering a conflict. That disciplinary rule provides that an attorney shall
not "handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances."
115. The best example of less-than-customary representation is that of counsel in In re Investigation
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fled. By parallel reasoning, the clients should be able to waive the more
detailed requirements of the ABA Standards.
C. THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AS A WAY TO PROTECT AGAINST LATER
OBJECTION BY COUNSEL'S CLIENTS

A third reason for the government to disqualify counsel or at least to obtain
his clients' waiver of any conflict is to protect against later constitutional
attack on the investigation or on a conviction. Apparently, no defendant has
attacked his conviction on the ground that a conflict at the grand jury stage
rendered counsel's representation constitutionally ineffective. The client
probably could not establish prejudice stemming from his counsel's failure
because of a conflict to negotiate a favorable plea bargain or immunity. But, a
convicted defendant might be successful if his trial attorney was barred from
cross-examining a former co-client who testifies for the government at trial6
when that former client, now witness, invokes the attorney-client privilege. 1
More likely than an attack on the conviction is an attack on the
investigation itself. United States v. Turkish"17 is illustrative. The New York
County District Attorney began an investigation of commodities dealings by
Bear Stearns & Co., a broker-dealer, and Norman Turkish, a limited partner
in Bear Stearns & Co. and a commodities futures specialist. The law firm that
represented Turkish during that state investigation informed him that it
perceived no conflict in its simultaneous representation of Bear Stearns and its
other employees. The law firm asked the district attorney's office to notify it if
that office believed that the firm had a conflict. Apparently having received

no notification of a conflict from the district attorney's office, the law firm
permitted Turkish to speak informally on several occasions with different
state prosecutors. Approximately ten months after Turkish was first interviewed by the district attorney's office, that office told Turkish that the law
firm had a potential conflict of interest because Turkish was a target. Turkish
was subsequently indicted by a state grand jury1 8 and by a federal grand jury
for conspiracy to defraud the United States, evasion of income tax, and the
9 The federal indictments
filing of false tax returns. 11
were based in part on the
information developed by the New York City District Attorney's office.
Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussed in note 3 supra). Even the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in affirming the disqualification order because of the importance of the
state's interest in an effective investigation, tacitly acknowledged that a client could waive his right to
effective representation. Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 525, 341 A.2d 896, 902-03 (1975), affd per curiam,
466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). A waiver by a client of
his right to effective representation satisfies the public's interest in counsel's performance. See In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176, 1179-80 n.2 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
116. The government has the converse problem. X and Y are represented by attorney A. That attorney,
after speaking with both clients, decides he must withdraw from representing X, but continues to represent
Y. Y then cooperates with the government against X. At X's trial, X argues that Y should not be permitted
to testify against him because attorney A helped structure Y's cooperation by means of the privileged
information he had received from X. One attorney reported that he had successfully suppressed such
testimony on these facts.
117. 470 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
118. The federal district court's opinion does not name those charges.
119. The district court's opinion does not identify the factual bases for these charges.
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Once Turkish was indicted, the law firm suggested that he obtain separate
counsel. He did, and replacement counsel then moved alternatively to dismiss
the federal indictment or to bar the federal prosecutor from using the
evidence gathered by the district attorney's office on the ground that the law
firm had had a conflict of interest which he had never waived.
The federal district court denied the motion, finding that no actual conflict
existed, that Turkish was surely aware of the potential for conflict, and that
there was no proof that the state and federal prosecutors could not have
obtained from other sources the information the state had received from
Turkish, or that the law firm would have represented Turkish any differently
had he been the firm's sole client. Nonetheless, the court held that the
prosecutor has a duty to inform an attorney and his clients of a potential or
actual conflict because at the preindictment stage no judge continuously
oversees the grand jury proceedings. 120 Hence, the court implied that it might
exercise its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment or to suppress the
evidence if the government failed to notify counsel and his clients of a conflict
problem. Turkish thus suggests not only that the government may not profit
from a conflict, but also that the wise prosecutor should institute a motion to
disqualify if counsel refuses to withdraw or his clients do not seek separate
representation once informed.
V.

THE RISKS OF MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION

The unwillingness of many courts to disqualify either because the government could not or would not meet its high burden of showing conflict or
because the clients were permitted to waive is, in my view, proper. That is not
to say, however, that attorneys should be quick to agree to represent more
than one client. Multiple representation may involve grave, and not always
foreseeable, risks for counsel's clients as well as for counsel personally. In this
section, I outline the potential problems, many of which to date remain,
thankfully, speculative. Nonetheless, foresighted- counsel should carefully
weigh the possible disadvantages against the advantages discussed in Part III
before undertaking multiple representation.12 1
120. 470 F. Supp. at 909 (citing SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (SEC has duty to notify
witnesses that their attorney may have conflict)).
121. Multiple representation may impede grand jury reform favored by defense counsel or provoke
legislative authorization to investigate defense counsel. As to the former, the government has opposed
permitting counsel to be present as his client testifies before the grand jury for fear that counsel would
disclose that testimony to his other clients, or for fear that counsel's presence will pressure a client not to
cooperate who otherwise would do so without disclosing that fact to counsel. See Favretto Address to ALIABA, supra note I, at 10-11. Of interest is the Colorado grand jury reform which permits counsel to
accompany his client while testifying but bars counsel from simultaneously representing others. See People
ex rel. Losavio v. J.L., 580 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978). Congressperson Eilberg, a leading proponent of grand jury

reform, opposed a proposed Senate reform to permit a witness to reject immunity because he feared that
witnesses would be reluctant to accept immunity if they worried that the others might retaliate. See
Hearings, supra note 67, at 8 (testimony by Hon. Joshua Eilberg).
As to the latter, there have been various proposals to authorize federal district courts to order
disciplinary proceedings against counsel who is guilty, inter alia, of conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar of that court, including, for example, malpractice, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
or a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. If a court learned that an attorney might have
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A. THE CLIENTS

The most obvious disadvantage of multiple representation for each client is
loss of the opportunity either to seek favor in return for cooperation or to
contrast his position against that of the others. Because few investigations will
terminate without indictments, at least as a result of multiple representation, 122 the pre-indictment stage provides the best opportunity for a target to
negotiate a favorable arrangement. 123 By seeking immunity, an individual
with some exposure to criminal liability may be able to insulate himself from
prosecution. 124 By seeking to plead no contest, a client may preserve his right
to indemnification for defense expenses. 125 By cooperating against an employee, a corporation may avoid suit by a shareholder. By making a proffer, a
target may be able to influence the government's
recommendation concerning
126
the charges for which he will be indicted.
Counsel may also be unable to obtain vital information because of the
conflict problem. He may refrain from interrogating each client closely or his
clients may fear disclosing information to him. The prosecutor may not notify
counsel of the target status of one of his clients or explain to counsel the
evidence that it possesses with respect to one or more of his clients for fear
that counsel will share that information with his other clients. This loss of
information may damage a client who is subpoenaed to testify. The client may
perjure himself or obstruct justice if he fails to testify accurately and fully. He
127
risks contempt if he improperly invokes the fifth amendment.

If immu-

nized, he may not recognize that he can maximize his protection by testifying
as fully as possible. And the client may be forced to waive the effect of a
conflict at a point when he does not have sufficient information to evaluate
the likely effect of the conflict.
committed such conduct, it could ask the United States Attorney to investigate. If after that investigation,
the United States Attorney thought that counsel had committed such conduct, the court could issue a show
cause order why counsel should not be disciplined. See S. 2723, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6044,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Department of Justice has also urged that, as part of any grand jury
reform, Congress bar multiple representation. See Hearingson H.R. 94, supra note 3, at 724 (Appendix I to
testimony by Benjamin R. Civiletti, then-Assistant Attorney General); cf id. at 955 (testimony of Gary P.
Naftalis) (private attorney who recommends enactment of "something approaching a per se rule"
prohibiting multiple representation at the grand jury stage).
122. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text (citing cases where multiple representation did cause
termination of investigation). One prosecutor reports that about one-half of the antitrust investigations end
with no indictment, but does not explain why. Favretto Address to ALI-ABA, supra note 1, at 17.
123. In the antitrust context, about 90% of those indicted plead guilty. Favretto Address to ALI-ABA,
supra note 1,at 17.
124. One defense counsel believes that use immunity may provide greater protection than transactional
immunity because the former bars the government from using the fruits of immunized testimony. See
Simon, Federal Witness Immunity in Business Crime Investigations, 4 LITIGATION 17, 18 (1978). The
jointly-represented client who refuses to make a proffer may forego immunity if the government is deciding
whether to immunize him or another witness not represented by counsel.
125. See ABA, HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 90.
126. One prosecutor reports that in the antitrust context the government will usually not make a
recommendation to the grand jury about indictments until defense counsel has had the opportunity to
argue why his client should not be indicted or should not be indicted for the charges contemplated.
Favretto Address to ALI-ABA, supra note 1, at 16.
127. See In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (order for
separate counsel vacated; court noted availability of contempt citation against witnesses improperly
invoking fifth amendment).
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The clients also run the risk of being charged with obstruction of justice. 128
Client A's payment of counsel's fees for Client B may be interpreted as a
device to keep Client B from cooperating. 129 Client A may discuss with Client
B their common plight in a way that influences Client B to invoke the fifth
amendment or not to testify fully to protect Client A.130 A non-target client
may decide to destroy documents which he fears might damage a target coclient.131 A client may be found in civil or criminal contempt if he improperly
invokes the fifth amendment. 132 Conduct like these examples may harm the
client even if it does not become the basis for a separate obstruction of justice
charge: at the client's later trial, such conduct may have evidentiary value as
demonstrative of his consciousness of guilt.
Multiple representation may also result in the disclosure of more information than would separate representation. If forced to testify at a hearing to
determine whether his waiver of the conflict is informed and voluntary, a
client might reveal information that could aid the prosecutor. This is
especially true if the court conducts that hearing without defense counsel
being present; 133 counsel thereby loses the opportunity to control the
testimony of his clients by careful examination, to object to questions asked by
the court that he considers irrelevant, and to oversee the testimony by his
clients to insure that they answer no more than they should in response to the
questions. Also, if counsel believes that Client A is obstructing justice, he may
be required under Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility to disclose the information that supports that
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (influencing or injuring officer, juror or witness generally) and § 1510
(obstruction of criminal investigations) (1976).
129. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979) (fact that two defendants who had
not paid counsel's fees had pleaded guilty found insufficient to establish conspiracy to obstruct justice in
that counsel retained to promote criminal conduct). Also the government may be able to discover the
identity of the payor and the payment arrangement because that information is not thought protected by
the attorney-client privilege, see In re Michaelson,511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975), although that information may be entitled to fifth amendment protection if its disclosure might
implicate the payor. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1979).
130. Conviction for obstruction based on an attempt to pressure a witness to invoke the fifth amendment
is proper even when that witness can properly invoke the privilege. See United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d
I111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917 (1974); United States v. Cole, 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). Client A's presence at the time that Client B testified might also be considered
obstruction. Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (target of investigation
was seen standing near counsel as he spoke with immunized co-client while latter was testifying before
grand jury), affd per curiam by equally divided court, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied. 439
U.S. 953 (1978).
131. See United States v. Fineman, 431 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1977), (obstruction of justice to destroy
document if person has reason to believe grand jury will want document and if he destroys it to prevent its
production), affd mem., 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
132.Cf. In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 604, 608 n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(witnesses had invoked privilege to questions concerning "age, marital status, number of children, name of
parents, and relationship with their attorney").
133. See In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.
1977) (defense counsel and prosecutor agreed that court could question clients about conflict question in
their absence). An unanswered question is whether the clients could be charged with perjury or whether
their testimony could be used to impeach them later at trial. Compare Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968) (government may not use in its case-in-chief defendant's testimony to obtain standing) with
United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (government could use in its case-in-chief defendant's false
statement of indigency given to obtain appointed counsel).
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belief. 134 If counsel fears that he himself will be charged with obstructing
justice based upon his representation of his clients, he may be free to disclose
whatever will protect him from prosecution. 135 If counsel's work product
covers all of his clients, he may be forced to disclose that work if one of his
clients demands disclosure once he decides to cooperate. 136 The attorneyclient privilege may not protect Client A from the disclosure of otherwise
privileged communications between Client A and Client B if Client B decides
to cooperate. 137 If counsel is house-counsel to the entity, communications to
him by employees or members of the entity may not be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 138 If counsel is forced to disclose his work product, 139
his extensive investigation of each client's position may harm one or all.
Finally, if counsel is forced to withdraw because of a conflict with Client A,
he may also be forced to withdraw from representing his remaining clients to
protect them. He may be barred by Client A's attorney-client privilege from
sharing confidential information obtained from Client A with his other
clients. He may be similarly barred from cross-examining Client A at the trial
of his other clients. An entity may be denied representation by its regularly
retained counsel in a later civil suit if he represented any of the entity's
employees or members in the criminal investigation of their conduct. 140 And,
134. Still unclear is the meaning of Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C)(2) (an attorney may reveal

"[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order")
and 4-101(C)(3) (an attorney may reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime") (footnotes omitted).
135. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.) (counsel, joined as civil
defendant with his law firm and its client, revealed his relevant conduct to SEC and to plaintiff's counsel in
attempt to obtain dismissal from suit), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Application of Friend, 411 F.
Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (over client's objection, attorney permitted to give to grand jury documents
otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege to defend himself against accusation of complicity with his
client).
136. See United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (work-product privilege
belongs to client).
137. The scope of the "common defense" protection for communications between defense counsel and
their clients is not as yet clear, and may provide protection for counsel's clients as they speak with each
other and to counsel. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1979)(alternative
holding) (attorney-client privilege barred disclosure by Defendant A of statements made by Defendant B to
Defendant A's attorney which Defendant A claimed would support his defense). But cf Allegaert v. Perot,
565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977) (no disqualification of counsel on conflict grounds because counsel's clients did
not expect that communications to counsel would be kept confidential between clients).
138. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509-10 (2d Cir. 1979) (statements by corporate
employees to general counsel to secure legal advice protected by corporation's attorney-client privilege); cf
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Mich. Aug. 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich.) (corporation
waived attorney-client privilege allowing attorney to testify about conversations with non-represented
employee over employee's objection), affd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1979).
139. Cf In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing civil contempt
citation of attorney who refused to testify about work product pertaining to interviews with non-employees
of client); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (government could not compel
defense counsel to report existence, time, place, or content of defense counsel's meeting with witness). For a
discussion of the efforts of the government to obtain information relevant to an investigation from opposing
counsel, see Tarlow, Witness for the Prosecution-A New Role for the Defense Lawyer, I NAT. J. CRIM.
DEF. 331 (1975).
140. See Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the Foundation for Successful
Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and Criminal Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567, 578-79

(1975) (confidences shared by employee with law firm in prior SEC investigation resulted in conflict of
interest in civil suit against employee).
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if counsel must withdraw from representing all of his clients,
each must incur
14
additional attorney's fees in retaining another attorney.'
B. COUNSEL

Multiple representation presents risks for counsel from so many sources
that a prudent attorney would usually be wise not to represent more than one
client. He may come under attack
from the prosecutor, from an ethics
142
committee or from his clients.
1. Criminal Exposure
An attorney who represents multiple clients may himself be a target of the
investigation. In many complex criminal enterprises the attorney is suspected
of being an integral part of the crime. 43 Intrusive questioning by the court of
counsel and his clients on the waiver issue may uncover
the damaging
44
information about counsel's participation in the scheme.
But, apart from involvement in the crime under investigation, counsel may
become the focus of investigation as a result of his representation. To date,
apparently no attorney has been charged with obstruction of justice under 18
U.S.C. § 1503 or § 1510 for his representation of his clients. 145 But the
government has46signalled its interest in counsel's representation as a so.rce of
"obstruction."' Counsel could interfere with the investigation in a way that
141. This will surely result if counsel attempts to precipitate the conflict by obtaining information from
the government to aid his clients in determining the target status of each and the evidence against each.
142. Counsel also risks contempt if he continues to speak to clients after having been disqualified. See
United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 272-73 (4th Cir. 1977) (attorney prohibited from contacting
clients to render advice concerning matter for which attorney was disqualified because of conflict of
interest). One attorney reported that his tax returns were audited as he represented co-clients--an audit he
suspected was precipitated by multiple representation. And none of the attorneys to whom I spoke relished
the prospect of disqualification, although one reported that his practice had increased after he had been
disqualified.
143. See note 11 supra.
144. See In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir.
1977) (after in camera, ex parte examination of witnesses, court concluded actual conflict existed). The
attorney was ultimately convicted in that case.
145. One innovative prosecutor told me that counsel also risked committing "misprision," 18 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1976) (making it a felony to knowingly and actively conceal commission of felony by another).
Whether counsel's likely defense to such a charge-the attorney-client privilege bars his disclosure of such
information-would prevail has not yet been tested.
146. See Favretto Address to Chicago Bar, supra note 1,at 17 ("[W]e would be naive if we did not
recognize that [multiple] representation can create an atmosphere conducive to the lawyer becoming a
participant in an effort to obstruct the investigation or to channel it into unproductive areas."); cf In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (unclear whether
government's reference to "obstruction" was intended to describe potentially criminal conduct by counsel
or the effect of multiple representation on grand jury's effectiveness). Several prosecutors with whom I
spoke were prepared to investigate whether counsel's conduct constituted obstruction; others were not.
Many defense attorneys feared that the government would broaden its investigation to include their
representation. Two attorneys who were disqualified from representing four clients, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Mich. 1976), because of their representation of another client, A, a
target, alleged that the prosecutors attempted to intimidate Client A, as he testified under a grant of
immunity, by threatening him and them with obstruction. Affidavit of William E. Bufalino, Sr., at 4 20,
8 29, In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Stephen Andretta, Grand Jury No. 75-313 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (in
support of Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Grand Jury Should Not Proceed Forthwith; dated Feb.
2, 1976) (copy on file with American Criminal Law Review).
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might constitute an obstruction of justice. For example, to prevent a conflict
from emerging, he might refuse to approach the government on behalf of a
client who wished to explore cooperation. He might encourage an immunized
client-witness to minimize his incrimination of a target client. He might,
overtly or subtly, 147 influence a non-client witness to testify less than candidly
or openly about his clients, he might fail to correct obviously inaccurate or
incomplete testimony by a client or by a non-client about his clients,148 or he
might prepare the testimony to be given by the witness. 149 He might not police
his clients to prevent them from pressuring a witness to testify in a particular
way, or he might not report his clients if he discovers that they have pressured
a witness. If, by accepting payment of his fee from a third party or from Client
A on behalf of Client B, he does not make clear that he will represent the
interests of the nonpaying client independently of the fee arrangement, the
nonpaying client may feel pressured not to cooperate.
Also, counsel's way of advising his clients about the fifth amendment may
be viewed skeptically by the government.150 An attorney can, without risk,
explain the nature of the fifth amendment and can advise his client to invoke
that privilege. Maness v. Meyers 5' suggests both the protection and the
problems for counsel in discussing the fifth amendment with his clients.
Maness, an attorney, had advised his client to invoke the fifth amendment and
not to produce certain allegedly obscene magazines, subpoenaed by the
government in a civil confiscation proceeding, which were similar to those for
which the client had already been criminally convicted for distributing. The
client refused to produce the subpoenaed material solely because of counsel's
advice. The state court found Maness in contempt because, in its view, the
147. For example, if counsel's clients were friends of a non-client witness, counsel might have his clients
accompany that witness everywhere. Or, counsel might interview all of his clients together, thereby
impeding any one from seeking separate representation or incriminating the others. Counsel might also
agree to represent a person whom the government expected would provide incriminating information about
counsel's other clients. See Transcript of Hearing on Initial Appearance of Angie Long Visitor 11-12
(D.S.D., Jan. 18, 1979) (counsel for defendant in one part of "Wounded Knee" litigation appeared specially
on behalf of person arrested pursuant to "material witness warrant;" government moved to disqualify
counsel; no decision by court, and attorney made no further appearance on behalf of witness) (copy on file
with American Criminal Law Review).
148. This is a ticklish problem for counsel, combining possible criminal exposure, cf United States v.
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972) (attorney convicted of aiding and abetting others in making false
statements when he should have known their statements were false), 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of felony);
with difficult ethical judgments, see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, Disciplinary Rule

7-102 (A)(3) (failing to disclose that which counsel is obliged to reveal), DR 7-102(A)(6) (participating in
creation or preservation of evidence counsel knows or should have known was false), DR 7-102(B)(2)
(failure to disclose fraud by non-client); and with the uncertain restrictions on disclosure stemming from
the attorney-client privilege), DR 4-101(C) (attorney may reveal client's intention to commit a crime).
149.An example occurred during discussion of a witness's answer in In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Stephen Andretta, Grand Jury No. 75-313 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (grand jury investigation of James Hoffa's
disappearance); see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Mich. 1976). A prosecutor
alleged that counsel had prepared an answer given by the witness and that counsel had misadvised the
witness to refuse to answer unless the interrogating prosecutor swore that he had taken an oath of secrecy.
Transcript of Hearing at 2, 5, In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Stephen Andretta, Grand Jury No. 75-313
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (copy of Transcript on file with American Criminal Law Review).
150. If, for example, counsel explains the potential charges to his clients, who then invoke the fifth
amendment without having been interviewed by counsel as to the involvement of each, counsel may have
simultaneously gone too far and not far enough. Cf In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531
F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussed in note 3 supra).
151. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
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fifth amendment did not apply to a civil proceeding. In a unanimous reversal
of the state court, 152 the Supreme Court held that the nature of the
information rather than the nature of the proceeding controlled whether the
invocation was proper, and that an attorney could not be disciplined if, in
good faith, he advised his client to ignore a court order that the subpoenaed
information would not incriminate him. But Maness also set forth important
although unclear restrictions on such advice. First, counsel must advise his
client in good faith that the information sought would incriminate him.
Second, counsel must advise; he may not instruct or order: 53 the decision to
invoke the privilege must be the client's choice. 154 Third, counsel is subject to
sanction if the government could not use his client's testimony or response
to
155
a subpoena duces tecum against him in a criminal proceeding.
Maness suggests that counsel must be careful in informing his clients of the
fifth amendment privilege. Because of the uncertainty of criminal exposure 156
of
his clients, many attorneys uniformly advise them to invoke the privilege.
Whereas that form of advice appears proper if counsel is in fact unsure
whether the client has criminal exposure, it is more questionable if he is
unsure in part because he has chosen not to interview his clients at length to
avoid the emergence of a conflict. Counsel may also have gone too far if he
advises Client A to invoke the privilege to protect Client B, if he influences
Client A not to testify after having been immunized, or if he advises his client
not to testify after the court157has determined that the client would not risk
incrimination by testifying.
The above examples will infrequently involve a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 or § 1510. In my discussions with prosecutors, however, they
divided about equally in answering the question of whether they might
investigate the way that counsel represented his clients. And one attorney was
subpoenaed to explain why he had counselled his clients to invoke the fifth58
amendment; he himself invoked the fifth amendment in refusing to answer. 1
Furthermore, the intrusive questioning of counsel and his clients at a waiver
hearing on the issue of conflict will increase the chances that counsel's
representation will come under investigation. The clients may testify that they
152. Justices Stewart (joined by Justice Blackmun) and White concurred in the result, each authoring a
separate concurring opinion.
153. Id. at 457 (emphasizing that state court that had reviewed contempt citation found that counsel
had "advised" rather than "instructed" his client not to produce supoenaed material).
154. Id. at 467. The difficulty of separating the force of counsel's "advice" from his client's "free choice"
obviously poses difficult problems of intent and understanding.
155. Id. at 468 (no basis to infer that fifth amendment privilege invoked in bad faith or without
reasonable grounds); id. at 473 (White, J., concurring). If his client is ordered to testify and if he
nonetheless believes that his client will incriminate himself, counsel should indicate that his client expects
to receive implicit immunity for his testimony. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (compelled
testimony, in absence of formal immunization, inadmissible at later criminal trial); In re Grand Jury
Empaneled Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1979) (trial court provided judicially created
immunity for documents produced in camera).
156. See Kramon, The Grand Jury: An Overview, 4 LITIGATION 8, 11 (1978).
157. Maness probably provides protection for counsel in the last example, however, at least as long as
counsel had a good faith belief that the court was wrong and that his client would incriminate himself by
testifying. 419 U.S. at 460, 468. Of course, the client thereby exposes himself to a contempt citation.
158. Counsel's conduct went unreported. I believe that except for matters specifically covered by
counsel's fifth amendment privilege, counsel must disclose the advice he gave to his clients or be
disqualified at his client's waiver hearing.
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felt pressured by counsel or that they interpreted his "advice" as pressure
either to refuse to cooperate or to invoke the privilege when they were
uncertain whether to do so. Although counsel's actions may have been
proper, he does not control his clients at a waiver hearing, a factor posing a
serious problem if he did not understand fully each client's desire, willingness
to blame anyone to avoid prosecution, or ability to comprehend his advice
and to make a personal assessment of what to do.
2. Ethical Inquiry
If a court refuses to disqualify counsel, it may nonetheless recommend or
request an ethical inquiry into counsel's compliance with the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility. 159 At a minimum, such an inquiry will prove
embarrassing to counsel. The inquiry will probably occur after the grand jury
investigation, and perhaps after the formal criminal proceedings have concluded. At that point, counsel's clients will have had the opportunity to
observe the effect of multiple representation. One or more may believe that
they were injured by multiple representation. If one was charged or convicted,
he may be bitter. He may not remember counsel's remonstrations about the
risks of multiple representation. Counsel himself may not have documented
the many instances in which he attempted to explain the conflict problem and
perhaps to dissuade his clients from joint representation.160 Even with that
documentation, counsel may be in peril if his clients steadfastly contend that
they did not understand what he said. Unless the court has conducted a
searching waiver hearing, counsel's credibility is pitted against that of his
clients with respect to the advice that he gave and to the understanding of his
clients. 161 Counsel may be forced to reveal confidences which would otherwise
be protected by the attorney-client privilege and which might reveal other
criminal conduct by his clients. The inquiry may also uncover other aspects of
counsel's representation which present difficult ethical issues. 162 Even if
absolved, no attorney can look forward to such an inquiry.
159. See SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reversing disqualification of counsel but
suggesting that SEC could institute ethics inquiry); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273, 278
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (court has power to discipline counsel for ethical breach); In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271,
266 A.2d 275 (1970) (ethics inquiry requested by state supreme court); cf. United States v. Garafola, 428 F.
Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1977) (cautioning attorneys that continued representation in face of conflict after
institution of formal charge might result in discipline), affd sub nom. United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d
1177 (3d Cir. 1978). Pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 1-102, the prosecutor may request an inquiry as may
the clients themselves. Several clients did so after the disqualification order was reversed in In re
Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The ethics committee absolved
counsel after reviewing affidavits and papers (including waivers by charging clients).
160. One defense. attorney suggests that counsel should explain to his clients, on each occasion when he
speaks with them together or separately, "all of their rights, liabilities, duties, obligations and opportunities
as witnesses . . . . and to memorialize this [statement] in some fashion on each occasion." Koelzer,
Multiple Representation of Grand Jury Witnesses (copy on file with American Criminal Law Review).
Counsel's caution succeeded: he was not disqualified in In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536
F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976).
161. See discussion of the ethical inquiry of counsel involved in In re Investigation Before April 1975
Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976), note 3 supra. Thus, counsel himself has a conflict at any waiver
hearing: to protect his clients he may want to avoid that hearing; to protect himself, he will want the
hearing.
162. Counsel faces difficult and not always certain ethical choices in advising his clients. Client A asks

19801

MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION

Moreover, during an ethical inquiry, counsel may encounter a court that
believes it can proscribe conduct which would not be outlawed by the
63
disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In re Abrams
is an extreme, albeit instructive, example. Attorney Abrams, at the sentencing
of his client, Young, urged leniency by characterizing Young's involvement in
the lottery business as minimal in contrast to that of a third person, Pickett.
Abrams acknowledged during allocution that his fee to represent Young had
been paid by Pickett who had promised to pay Abrams' fee to represent
anyone involved in Pickett's lottery business. A finding by an ethics committee that Abrams had committed no ethical violation in the course of
representing Young did not satisfy the New Jersey Supreme Court. The court
found a conflict inherent in a payment arrangement whereby a superior in a
criminal enterprise paid counsel's fees to represent an inferior. Young's
waiver of the conflict, in the court's view, did not eliminate counsel's
obligation not to represent an individual in such a setting. In reprimanding
Abrams, the court announced that this rather trivial sanction should not be
taken as an indication of the possible sanction to be imposed in the future for
such representation.
3. Loss of Money
Counsel may lose money or be forced to spend money because of multiple
representation. If he must withdraw, and has charged a fixed rather than an
hourly fee, he may have no way to value the benefit of what he has done for
his clients. Or, he may be forced to disgorge his fee. 164 If he must withdraw, he
may be required to withdraw from representing all of his clients. 65 If he or the
government appeals a disqualification order, 166 if he is investigated by an
ethics committee, or if he is sued for malpractice, he will probably retain
counsel for himself. If found to have acted unethically, he may be forced to
pay a fine. 67 If he represents the entity and its employees or members, he may
hypothethically what would happen if certain documents were never found or never "existed," or whether
he should retain or give to counsel certain evidence. Client A asks counsel to reveal what Client B has said
about his own and Client A's involvement. Client A, but not Client B, wants to cooperate; how does counsel
advance the interests of each? Which client does he continue to represent, or must he withdraw from
representing both? See also Tague, supra note 22, at 1126 n.290.
163. 56 N.J. 271, 278, 266 A.2d 275, 279 (1970).
164. Counsel may also not be paid by a third-party payor if it determines that payment of fees on behalf
of target employees is not a proper expenditure. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273, 278
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (court questioned why counsel for union represented union members when investigation
concerned matter unrelated to lawful union activity; counsel, however, represented members gratis).
165. See Tague, supra note 22, at 1080 n.26. However, I could find no instance in which counsel
withdrew, voluntarily or by court order, from representing all of his clients. See, eg., In re Grand Jury
Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976) (counsel voluntarily withdrew from
representing entity, but continued to represent individuals; not disqualified); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262
(5th Cir. 1976) (counsel voluntarily withdrew from representing target, but continued to represent
nontargets; disqualified); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (counsel
voluntarily withdrew from representing all but one of his clients who were offered promise of
nonprosecution and continued to represent others; disqualified from representing the remaining client who
was offered nonprosecution), affd per curiam by equally divided court, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
166. Attorneys have themselves retained counsel on appeal in several instances. See note 98 supra.
167. The Board of Governors of the California Bar has asked the legislature to authorize it to fine
attorneys up to $2,500 for misconduct. 54 CAL. ST. BAR J. 391 (1979).
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be dismissed by that entity from representing it in a parallel civil proceeding 68
or from representing it in general.
Perhaps counsel's most serious monetary problem is the threat of a
malpractice suit brought by a disgruntled client. An imprisoned defendant
convicted of a street crime may be unaware that he can sue counsel for
malpractice, may be unable to retain counsel to press such a suit, and
probably could not prove harm. But a convicted white-collar defendant-whether an individual or an entity-is perhaps better able to assess the
impact of counsel's choice to represent more than one client, and is probably
more likely to sue. 169 Such a defendant, now plaintiff, might be able to show
harm if counsel had refused to seek immunity or a favorable plea bargain on
behalf of that former client because of the conflict problem.
Even victory for counsel in a malpractice suit may prove costly. The
malpractice suit brought by E. Howard Hunt against William Bittman and
the law firm of Hogan & Hartson,170 although yet another extreme example, is
illustrative. As a partner in Hogan & Hartson, Bittman represented Hunt
during the Watergate affair. According to Hunt, Bittman acted as the conduit
of "hush" money paid by the White House to Watergate burglars, of whom
Hunt was one. Bittman and Hunt were both apparently informed by
government attorneys 7' that Bittman may have had a conflict in representing
Hunt. Bittman himself was a possible target and had tailored his defense of
Hunt to the interests of the payor of his fee-the White House. Hunt alleged,
inter alia, that because of the conflict, Bittman and Hogan & Hartson had
failed to reveal their personal interests which were at odds with Hunt's, 172 had
revealed confidential information to others, 173 had failed to represent Hunt
adequately during negotiations with the prosecutors, and, during Hunt's
appearances before grand juries, 74 had "encouraged and condoned" Hunt's
concealment of information and his perjury and had themselves concealed
176
evidence,175 and had deterred Hunt from testifying in judicial proceedings.
177
Hunt's suit was dismissed, but not before Bittman and Hogan & Hartson
168. See Mathews, supra note 140, at 573-74.

169. I could find no instance, however, in which counsel's clients sued him. Cf Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593
F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979) (malpractice suit based on attorney's representation of clients with conflict in civil
litigation) (opinion vacated; en banc decision pending).
170. Hunt v. Bittman, No. 77-1724 (D.D.C., Jan. 9, 1980) (order to dismiss). Plaintiff, E. Howard Hunt,
Jr., sought $5 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. Hunt reportedly paid
the defendants' $156,000 in attorneys' fees. Id., Amended Complaint. Count I,
3, at 3.
171. Id., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Bittman's Motion to
Dismiss, at 21 n.8.

172. Id., Amended Complaint, Count I, t 5, at 3. The alleged conflict involved the possibilities that
Bittman might be called as a witness by the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office to testify about Hunt's
demands for "hush" money and that Bittman himself might become a focus of that Office's investigation
due to his representation of Hunt. [Plaintiffs] Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 19 (May 29,
1979), Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Bittman's Motion to Dismiss at

20.
173. Id., Amended Complaint, Count I,
5, at 3.
174. Id.,
6, at 3-4.
175. Id., i 9a, at 4.
176. Id., Count IV,
17, at 6. This allegation was part of a more general cause of action alleging that
the defendants had obstructed justice while representing Hunt.
177. Id., Order [Granting Defendants' Motion for Dismissal, Treated as Motion for Summary
Judgment]. In granting the defendants' motion on the ground of the statute of limitations, the court
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had reportedly spent over a million dollars in defense. Bittman also withdrew
as a partner from Hogan & Hartson and is under investigation by an ethics
178
committee as a result of his representation of Hunt.
VI. CONCLUSION

The courts have spoken inconsistently and unclearly about the propriety of
multiple representation at the grand jury stage. As does the American Bar
Association in its Code of Professional Responsibility, the courts place
responsibility largely on counsel to decide whether to represent more than one
client. I have attempted to identify some of the factors which counsel should
consider: the tactical advantages and disadvantages of multiple representation, the risk to counsel and to his clients. Although I do not believe that a
motion to disqualify should be granted, except in exceptional circumstances,
neither do I believe that prudent counsel should undertake multiple representation, except in'extraordinary circumstances. The risks are too great for his
clients. The waiver hearing may damage the clients; obviously, so also may
multiple representation if counsel understands the conflict problem and
hobbles his representation accordingly. Nor are many clients worth the
personal risk to counsel of multiple representation.179 But, if counsel does
undertake multiple representation, he should withdraw at the first sign of a
serious conflict; 80 the conflict problem is not one that counsel can solve or
bury by continued representation. Like a cancer, a conflict will grow, dividing
counsel from his clients and his clients from each other, harming all to the
potential advantage of the government.
suggested a separate problem for counsel burdened with a conflict: fraudulent concealment of the basis of
the cause of action will toll the statute of limitations. Id. at II. See Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly &
Califano, 390 A.2d 992 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978).

178. See Legal Times, Oct. 29, 1979, at 32.
179. This is the view of several attorneys. The one exception may be when counsel is sympathetic to the
political position of his clients.
180. Because counsel has made no formal appearance, he should be able to withdraw without obtaining
judicial approval. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-110. Thus,
he need not disclose the reason for his decision-an explanation that might jeopardize his clients' position.

